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An Examination of Congressional Misunderstanding of  the Role of 
Speculation in Futures Markets.■•(79’ p p . )
Director:  David Weber
The understanding of fu tures  markets by the general public and . 
the government is paradoxical.  Futures markets are economic markets 
which benef i t  the public through s ta b i l i z e d  pr ices fo r  agr icu l tu ra l  
products re f lec ted  in the cost fo r  groceries .  Yet in th is  country, 
fu tures  markets have been subject  to governmental and public c r i t i ­
cism since t h e i r  beginning in the mid-1880s. The problem is  misun­
derstanding. Futures markets are not widely understood by the pub­
l i c  or government o f f i c i a l s .  Indeed, a committee of the House of 
Representatives once labeled fu tures  markets as e so te r ic  in nature.  
Part of th is  misunderstanding stems from-misconceptions held by 
Congress of the role  of futures  market pa r t i c ip a n ts ,  p a r t i cu la r ly  
the ro le  of the speculator.
Congress has attempted to define i t s  re la t ionsh ip  with futures 
markets since 1922 when the f i r s t  l eg i s la t io n  regulat ing futures 
markets was passed. This w r i te r  has examined the l eg i s la t ion  
passed since 1922 and numerous congressional hearings to de te r ­
mine past  and present  congressional perceptions of speculators in 
futures markets.
The findings of th i s  research support the premise tha t  the role  
of the speculator in fu tures  markets i s  misunderstood by Congress. 
Evidence of the problem i s  exhibited in the language of the law and 
in subsequent hearings to modify the law.
This w r i te r  concludes with suggestions to correct  t h i s  misunder­
standing. The suggestions are offered as possible means to aid 
Congress in understanding the ro le  of the speculator.  I f  Congress 
expands i t s  knowledge of the ro le  of the specula tor ,  a more com­
p le te  understanding of the uniqueness of futures markets will 
r e s u l t .  More e ffec t iye  and sound regulatory po l ic ies  might be 
passed and, consequently, fu tu res  markets will continue as a v i t a l  
cog in the United S ta tes  economy. The general public will he the 
ult imate  benefactors.
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Chapter 1
BASICS OF THE FUTURES MARKETS
Futures markets. What are they? A decided mystique surrounds 
futures markets because such a small proportion of people understand 
th e i r  function. The idea of futures trading can be traced to twelf th 
century medieval f a i r s  in France and England. In the United S ta tes ,  
futures  markets developed in the midnineteenth century. The essence 
of futures markets did not develop overnight , nor can any individual 
be credi ted  with t h e i r  conception. Their unfoldment i s  rooted in com­
merce along with the maturation of cash markets.
Elements of Futures Trading
Futures markets serve as a medium fo r  contracts  of future  spot 
transactions to be purchased or sold. The contracts  for  the future 
transactions are in asse ts  or services and the markets serve as 
disseminating price information of the pa r t i cu la r  contracts .
Contracts traded in futures markets provide for agreement today to 
deliver (a short position) , or take delivery of (a long position)., 
a specified grade and quantity of an asset at a specified loca­
tion (s) and time(s) in the future at a price negotiated and stipu­
lated through auction agreements (Burns, 1979:32).
The contracts  to be exchanged in fu tures  markets are governed 
by market forces.  These same market forces rule  the l iq u id i ty  of 
futures markets. Legally, futures contracts  must be traded upon an
approved futures exchange. There are eleven futures exchanges in the
United Sta tes .  Thomas Hieronymus outlined the essent ia l  elements of
1
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futures t rading: "contracts made for  purposes other  than exchange of
t i t l e  (although not c lear ly  recognized), deposit  of  funds to guarantee 
performance, r e s t r i c t i o n  of trade to members, and standardized contract  
terms" (Hieronymus, 1971:74).
In the United S ta te s ,  futures exchanges transposed contracts  on 
s to rab le  commodities su c h as  g ra in ,  corn, and soybeans. In 1964 the 
Chicago Mercantile Exchange proffered the maiden contract  on a nonstor- 
able commodity—live  c a t t l e .  The l ive  c a t t l e  contrac t  proved to be 
prosperous and developed in to  other nonstorable commodity contracts .
The next reasonable step was contracts on financial  instruments. Why? 
Money is  a commodity. Money can be stored and exchanged. The -price 
of money is  re f lec ted  on the foreign currency market for  each country's  
present ra te  o f  exchange. This ra te  simulates the purchasing power 
of the country 's  currency r e la t iv e  to other  countr ies .
Leo Melamed is  known as the fa ther  of f inancial  futures 
because he bolstered the foreign currency futures market. This became 
the f i r s t  f inancial  fu ture  contract .  I t  was l i s t e d  by the Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange in 1972.
The succeeding gradation, was the development of in t e r e s t  ra te  
futures contracts .  The f i r s t  i n te r e s t  ra te  fu ture  contract  was the 
Government National Mortgage Association (GNMA) contract  in 1975 and 
the adjoining 90-day treasury b i l l  contract  in 1976. Since then, 
futures contracts  have been launched in United States treasury bonds, 
one-year treasury b i l l s ,  and four-year t reasury notes. These were 
immensely successful and today the market fo r  treasury bonds enjoys
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the g rea te s t  open in te r e s t  of a l l  the futures contrac ts .  Corn and 
soybean contracts  are now second and th i rd ,  respect ively .
Financial futures now account for  30 percent of  a l l  futures 
trading volume (Byrne, 1982). This i s  remarkable when one considers 
th a t  the f i r s t  f inancial  futures was contracted in 1972. Futures con­
t r a c t s  based on private  secu r i t ie s  such as commercial paper and c e r t i f ­
ica tes  of deposi ts were developed in the l a t e  1970s and ear ly  1980s. 
These contracts  have not obtained as great  a volume as government 
secu r i t ie s  contracts .  This s i tua t ion  is  expected to change as more 
i n s t i tu t io n a l  investors use the f inancial  futures contracts .
Agricultural commodities futures were developed by commercial 
buyers and s e l l e r s  of the commodity to hedge th e i r  price  r i sk  from mar­
ket influences. Financial futures  provide a vehicle fo r  in s t i tu t io n s  
and secur i ty  dealers in  f inancial  markets to hedge th e i r  r isks  from 
i n te r e s t  ra te  f luc tua t ions .  The succeeding futures contract  on equity- 
based futures i s  a component of  th is  evolutionary chain of r i sk  avoid­
ance contracts .  The issuing,  buying, and se l l ing  of stocks by individ­
ua ls ,  corporations,  and investment bankers is  exposed to market r i sk .  
In te re s t  ra te  v o l a t i l i t y  is  a fac to r  of market r i sk .  Stock index con­
t r a c t s  and contracts  founded on individual stocks can be put to use to 
o f f s e t  th i s  r i sk  in the cash market fo r  stocks.  A stock index future 
t ied  to the Value Line index was l i s t e d  by the Kansas City Board of 
Trade in February 1982. Open in t e r e s t  in the contract  has been superior 
to previous open in t e r e s t  leve ls  of newly l i s t e d  contrac ts .  A contract  
usually requires two years to exhib i t  market maturity.
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Applications pending before the Commodity Futures Trading Com­
mission are futures contracts  such as those t ied  to the producer price 
index, Dow Jones Stock Index, and Standard and Poor's 500 composite 
stock index, prime r a t e ,  and money supply. Financial instrument con­
t r a c t s  are an tic ipa ted  to maintain t h e i r  immense growth in volume and 
open in t e r e s t  because equity and money markets wil l perpetually be 
beseiged by uncertainty and changeableness.
Market Par t ic ipants
Who are the pa r t ic ipan ts  in futures markets? There are two
types: hedgers and speculators .  A hedger produces or purchases a
commodity in the cash market. Influences beyond the hedger's control 
pro jec t  uncertainty into levels  of prices paid for  the physical com­
modity. Gash and futures  prices tend to move in the same direc tion  
because they react  to the same economic influences.  Because they 
move in tandem, a hedger can o f f s e t  his r i sk  in the cash market by
taking an equal but opposite posit ion in the futures market. The
difference between the cash market price and the futures  market price 
i s  addressed the basis .  The concept of a hedge is  to cover one's 
posi t ion in the cash market.
The risk for the processor or user of commodities is the reverse, 
that the supply situation will tighten to a point that rising 
prices will add to his costs and impair his profits. The producer 
or owner of commodities will use a selling, short hedge as pro­
tection against declining values. The user of commodities will 
use a buying, long, hedge in. futures contracts to protect against 
rising prices (Commodity Training Manual, 1980:9).
The r i s ing  prices refe rred  to are prices fo r  commodities im the  cash
market.
Speculators do not mater ia l ly  possess a spec i f ic  i n t e r e s t  in 
the physical commodities but observe the movement between cash and 
futures p r ices .  A speculator assesses price  movement and r isks  venture 
capi ta l  for  the sake of p ro f i t .  Speculators buy or se l l  futures con­
t r a c t s  in response to t h e i r  estimation of price movement, d i rec t ion ,  
and swing.
To the extent that the speculative holding of inventories is ton 
balance) successful, it performs a useful economic function by 
reducing swings in commodity prices. The smaller swings in 
commodity prices foster expectations of greater long-run price 
stability. In turn, the reduction of price risk fosters an 
increase of commercial demand for inventories Jwhichi directly 
promotes larger commercial demand. ... ...This encourages produc­
tion, which also tends to enhance market liquidity (Burns, 1979:
2 2) .
The costs  to speculators are t ransac t ion  costs and the cost  of carrying 
an open in te re s t .
I t  is  possible  to group speculators by trading habits .  Four 
groups are general ly recognized: ( I )  posi t ion t r a d e rs ,  (2) day traders
(3) sca lpers ,  and (4) spreaders. A posit ion t rade r  i n i t i a t e s  a trade 
and holds i t  through days, weeks, and even months. Position trading 
is  most widely u t i l i z e d  by public commodity t raders  and professional 
t raders  who are members of an exchange. Day t raders  are those who main 
ta in  a market posit ion for  the course of a day and rare ly  hold i t  
overnight. Day traders  often execute t h e i r  t ransactions in the trading 
p i t s  in person. Scalpers are professional t raders  t r a f f ick in g  in daily 
price f luc tua t ions .  "His technique is  to trade in minimum f luctuat ions  
taking small p ro f i t s  and consequently, small lo sses ,  on heavy yolume of 
t rades" (Commodity Trading Manual, 1980:104). As a r e s u l t  of s c a lp e r s1 
wil lingness to purchase a t  the asking price  and se l l  a t  the bid p r ice ,
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th is  group contr ibutes the la rges t  portion of to ta l  speculative l iqu id ­
i ty .  A spreader is a speculator who dist inguishes re la t ionsh ips  
between or  among prices o f  the same future  on d i f f e re n t  markets or 
prices of d iss im i la r  contracts .  When perchance price re la t ionships  
considered to be normal because of supply-demand conditions become d i s ­
to r te d ,  a spreader will command two simultaneous posi t ions .  Through a 
spreader 's  react ion to d i s to r t io n s ,  prices  rea l ign  to t h e i r  normal 
re la t ionsh ips .
A small capi ta l  outlay of 5 to 15 percent of  the to ta l  value 
of a contract  must be put up as margin. Margin in this: sense i s  a good 
f a i th  performance deposit  and is  not to be confused with the buying 
of stocks on margin. A t rade r  is  credi ted with the price movement on 
the fu l l  value of the contract .  This is  the essence of leverage. For 
example, a 90-day treasury b i l l  contract  i s  in denominations of $1,000,000 
per con trac t ,  but the margin requirements to secure the contract  i s  approx­
imately $2,000. Leverage can work fo r  or against  one's posi t ion.  I f  the 
t r a d e r ' s  prediction of  price  moyement proves to be inco rrec t ,  he 
receives a margin cal l  to bring his account to  the required l e v e l , Mar­
gins can be eroded in a day of trading and the t rade r  must honor each 
margin cal l  or face having his i n te r e s t  sold by the c learing corporation 
in the market.
The clear ing corporation of an exchange a c t s  as: an intermediary 
between the buyer and s e l l e r .  I t  becomes the opposite party to each 
contract  bought or sold. This allows p a r t ie s  to the t ransact ion  to 
remain anonymous. The success of th i s  system can be gauged by the 
number of contract  de fau l ts .  The Chicago Board of Trade Clearing
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Corporation is  proud th a t ,  in i t s  54-year establ ishment,  no customer 
has ever l o s t  a dime owing to contract  default .
Futures trading is  a zero sum game. The cash value of a l l  
futures contracts  is  zero because transactions are accounted fo r  by 
the mark-to-market a c t iv i t y .  All p ro f i t  and loss posit ions are 
s e t t l e d  da i ly ,  thus each contract  has a value of zero a t  the end of 
a trading day.
Prices are disseminated from trading f loors  through the 
Associated Press, United Press In te rna t iona l ,  Commodity News Service, 
U.S. Department of Agriculture,  and Dow Jones publicat ions such as 
the Wall S tr e e t  Journal and Barron's, This re su l t s  in futures prices 
being inexpensive and easy to obtain. The information is  opportune 
and universal .
Chapter 2
THE ROLE OF THE SPECULATOR
What is  Speculation?
What creates speculation? Opinions. These conclusions are 
developed through the trading f l o o r ' s  function as a forum fo r  opin­
ions. As one author expressed i t ,  information f a l l s  onto the t r a d ­
ing f loor  and flows through l ike  tomatoes into a Cuisinart  (Katz,
1981).
Trading on the f loo r  is  conducted in p i t s  or r ings.  Each 
futures contract  has a designated p i t  where t raders  congregate a t  
the opening be l l .  Buying and se l l in g  is  done by open outcry in the 
p i t .  Traders en te r  the p i t  with t h e i r  be l ie fs  based on technical 
char t s ,  fundamentals of supply and demand, or i n s t in c t .  These 
b e l ie f s  are discussed and churned about by the t raders .  The per­
ceptions are then expressed in buying and se l l in g  act ions.
The opinions are important because they shape the pricing 
mechanism fo r  futures markets. Speculators need to understand 
cash and futures price re la t ionsh ips  before they can trade.  The more 
accurate a speculator is  in forecasting prices and reacting to new 
information s k i l l f u l l y ,  the g rea ter  the  specu la to r 's  success.
New information th a t  a f fec ts  a. speculator';S 'perception of 
price movement comes from numerous sources such as statements of -
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future governmental pol icy ,  U.S. Department of Agriculture repor ts ,  
Federal Rdserve Board ac t ions ,  and economic ind ica tors .  All these 
fac tors  enter  into a specu la to r 's  assessment of future pr ice movement. 
Opinions therefore  create  the impetus for  speculation.
In recent years ,  there  have been a r t i c l e s  in popular magazines 
focusing on the dynamics of fu tures  markets. An a r t i c l e  by Donald 
Katz (1981) for  Esquire centered on the power, force ,  and drive of 
futures  markets. Picture the opening of the t reasury b i l l  p i t  on 
the International  Monetary Market. At 8:00 A.M., a gong rever­
berates through the a i r  sounding the opening of the day’s trading 
for  treasury b i l l s .  Traders lurch into act ion. What the futures 
industry pegs as the " la s t  breath of capitalism" i s  s e t  into motion 
or ,
as all the commodities boys like to say, "the last frontier" —
. . . [begins] to undulate with spinning numerals like an 
electric flight departure board gone beserk. Men with public- 
address systems for voices . ■ . . [bellow] promises for the 
future at one another, craning their necks unnaturally as they 
. . .  Itry] to watch the boards flash new numbers. All of them 
. . . [lean] into the press of the pit with their heads tilted 
toward the ceiling, like tired swimmers, like dogs baying at 
the moon (Katz, 1981:34).,
To say th a t  trading on the f loor  i s  intense i s  an understatement. The
pace i s  f a s t  and i f  one 's trading is  o f f  a day—a hoarse voice from a
cold—one pays for  i t  dearly.
One of the substances of th i s  in ten s i ty  i s  leverage. As; 
mentioned e a r l i e r ,  a margin of 5 to 15 percent of the face value of 
a contract  is  required as performance a ssu r i ty .  The value of roost 
contracts  is  a t  l e a s t  $50,000 and treasury b i l l s  are in contracts  of
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$1,000,000 each. Because of  leverage,  t raders  are dealing with vol­
umes of money hundreds of times g rea te r  than they possess.
I f  a speculator purchases one Standard and Poor's futures 
contract  represented by contracts  of $50,000 each, the margin requ ire ­
ment is  $6,500. The minimum fluc tua t ion  per contract  i s  .05 points .
Each .05 point  change is  one t ic k  representing $25. The daily  pr ice
l im i t  move is  3.00 points or $1,500. A price move from 97.60 to 
98.60 would be 1.00 or $500. The speculator  could rea l ize  a gain of 
$500 on his long posi t ion.  Traders f igure  t h e i r  p ro f i t  or  loss on 
each contract  by taking each .05 point change times $25 (standard  
and Poor's 500 Stock Index Futures, 1980).
Another fac tor  contr ibuting to the throbbing energy in the
p i t s  i s  t h a t  80 percent of speculative trades in futures lose. This
a l l  adds up to an incredible  amount of r i sk .  Every t rader  has a 
s tory  about a fellow t rader  f a i l in g  in the market.
Donald Katz of Esquire mazazine spent time in the p i t s  i n t e r ­
viewing t rade rs .  In the course of his conversations with t r ad e r s ,  
one had th is  to say about a losing posi t ion:  "Yeah, j u s t  the other
day," a bearded t rader  said to Mr. Katz, " th is  guy's blubberin'  
and cry in '  and getting* down in f ron t  of me on his knees beggin' me 
for  twenty grand. I t  was rea l ly  p i t i f u l "  (Katz, 1981:34). The 
rewards are handsome i f  you win, but a loss can be devastating!
The p i t  i s  a way of l i f e  for  t raders :  once they are a par t
of the economic warfare,  they find i t  hard to drag themselves away. 
Walter J.  Bresser t ,  president of Hal Commodity Cycles Inc. and a
11
well-known futures t rader  in Chicago, summed the sentiment of  the 
boys in the p i t :  "I wouldn't  want to l ive  without t rading. The mar­
kets mean th a t  much to me" (Hamilton, 1979:40).
In the same interview session moderated by Milo Hamilton, 
t rader  R. E. McMaster J r .  said the market helped him rea l ize  the 
sensat ion of being a f ree  man. In the p i t ,  one conforms to no 
standards but one 's  own. I t ' s  t rader  against  t rade r - - the  worst a 
t rader  can do is  allow his perception of r e a l i t y  to be affected by 
vested in te re s t s  (Bernstein, 1979d:44).
Unchanging a t t i tu d in a l  se ts  about the market can lock a t rader  
in to  a losing posi t ion and, i f  he f igh ts  the market, he will f a i l .
Once mistaken perceptions of market movement color trading hab i t s ,  
t raders  will r ide Tosses perpetual ly and increase t h e i r  losing posi­
t ion .  Stubbornness in perceptions about market d i rec t ion  seldom leads 
to successful t rad ing .
So what i s  the key to success in futures trading? According 
to Walter Bressert ,  the best  trades seem to a r i se  out of knowing the 
technical aspect of what a market looks l ik e  and a . gut fee l ing about 
what the market fee ls  l ike  (Hamilton, 1979). Three aspects of  t rad ­
ing can be iden t i f i e d :  (1) ana lys is ,  (2) money management, and
(3) the trading fac to r .  Analysis involves deciding when the market 
i s  going to top and bottom out and the price  level a t  which i t  will 
do so.
Money management i s  referred  to as the single most important 
aspect  of trading. A t rader  should employ s t r i c t  money management
concepts. I f  he doesn 't  manage his capita l  e f f e c t iv e ly ,  he tends to 
lose money f a s t e r  than he makes i t .  This is  known as- a pyramiding 
e f f e c t .  In a pyramid, a t rade r  overcommits resources. He may become 
overconfident and lose s igh t  o f  money management considerations. He 
becomes careless in watching the market and makes mistakes th a t  may 
not be frequent , but they are severe.
The trading fac to r  i s  the most d i f f i c u l t  to master. I t  means 
being able to plunge head-on into  a market, gett ing hu r t ,  taking r i sk s ,  
and general ly a t ta in ing  a feel  fo r  i t .  The trading fac to r  teaches a 
t rader  to know himself,  especia l ly  a f t e r  taking a heavy loss .  In order 
to survive in the market, a t rader  has to keep changing. He has to 
learn about himself and he should not r e s i s t  growth. Losses teach him 
how to t rade .  Walter Bressert  sa id ,  "Take a l l  the self-awareness 
courses, and throw them out the window. You don 't  need those with the 
market. The market j u s t  pounds self-awareness into you" [Hamilton, 
1979:40).
What Influences a Speculator?
What influences a speculator? Jacob Bernstein, a psychologist 
and commodity t r a d e r ,  targeted some emotional fac tors  tha t  influence 
the way a person trades.  Alas, these emotional fac tors  are not d i s ­
cussed in.commodity trading manuals. Recognition of emotional fac tors  
would allow a t rader  to ad jus t  his trading system and consider the 
emotional responses th a t  stand in the way of successful trading [Bern­
s t e in ,  1979a).
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Mr. Bernstein, in a se r ies  of  commodity a r t i c l e s  introduced 
the psychology of a commodity t rade r .  He s ta ted  th a t  fear  and greed 
are dominant psychological fac tors  th a t  influence commodity t rading.
He r e i t e r a te d  th a t  fea r  and greed are broad surface forces th a t  have 
substant ia l  implications beneath the individual psyche. Fear i s  an 
indication of ignorance. I f  one does not understand the trading sys­
tem, one may experience a great  deal of fear .
Too o f ten ,  t raders  depend on advisory advice, a broker 's  
advice, rumors, or a f r i e n d ' s  advice ra ther  than on firmly rooted 
knowledge of the trading system. This spec i f ica l ly  applies to a small 
t r ade r .  He often moves too soon when a posit ion is  against  him, only 
to  watch i t  s h i f t  favorably a f t e r  he has o f f s e t  his posi t ion .  This is 
known as being whipsawed. On the other  side of  the coin, he can place 
s top- loss  orders and l iqu ida te  them before the s top-ioss  is  h i t .
Anxiety i s  pa r t  of the f ea r  aspect  of the t r a d e r ' s  psyche.
A t rader  may l iqu ida te  a posi t ion with p r o f i t  potential  because of 
anxiety stemming from sources outside the commodity markets. Fear 
can lead a t rader  to avoid making t rades ,  i n i t i a t e  trades not intended 
from the beginning, e x i t  good t rades too soon, or r e t a in  bad trades 
too long.
The greed component of  a t rade r  is  not in s ig n i f ican t .  I t  
can r e s u l t  in destruct ive  p i t f a l l s  from poor trading decisions.
Greed can induce a t rader  into holding p ro f i tab le  trades too long, 
trading in markets th a t  should be evaded, sustaining too large a 
pos i t ion ,  and overtrading a market. Greed may r e s u l t  in over­
confidence. Bernstein noted th a t  greed may have i t s  beginning in
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insecur i ty .  A t rade r  may feel  insecure about a s i tu a t io n  and overreact  
to compensate for  the insecure feeTings(s).  Mr. Bernstein commented 
th a t  an aggregate of fear  and greed is beneficial  in trading the 
markets. A successful t rader  will find the mean between the two fac­
tors and trade from there (Bernstein, 1979a).
One learns to be a winner in commodity markets by recognizing 
the internal  perceptions and the psychology involved in futures t r ad ­
ing. Edwin LeFever, in Reminiscences o f  a Stock Operator, had some 
words of wisdom fo r  commodity speculators.
It is no trick at all to be right on the market. You always find 
lots of early bulls;£n bull markets and early bears in bear markets. 
I've known many men who were right at exactly the right time. And 
their experience invariably matched mine— that is, they made no 
real money out of it. Those who can BE RIGHT and SIT TIGHT are 
uncommon (Bernstein, 1979b:32).
Who is  the speculating public? I t  is  estimated th a t  97 percent 
of a l l  commodity t raders  are men. Of the 5,000 t raders  reg is te red  on 
the New York and Chicago futures  exchanges, 60 are women (Mackay-Smith.,
1982). Traders in the p i t s  are formerly from a var ie ty  of occupations; 
doctors ,  lawyers, professors ,  law o f f i c e r s ,  professional a th l e t e s ,  and 
an economist or two.
I t  i s  possible  to speculate in futures  contracts  without being 
a member of an exchange by working through a futures commission mer­
chant. Futures commission merchants are  members of exchanges and trade 
fo r  t h e i r  own and t h e i r  customers' accounts. Futures commission mer­
chants require potent ial  customers to possess enough venture capita l  
to cover th e i r  f u tu r e ' s  market posi t ion and maintain the necessary 
margin. Once a futures commission merchant has confirmed the existence
of  enough venture capita l  to commence trad ing ,  a customer will be 
allowed to open an account. I t  thus i s  possible fo r  small speculators 
to speculate in futures.
Another portion of the speculative pie comes from pooled a sse t  
accounts which f a c i l i t a t e  small investors buying into  the funds. The 
i n i t i a l  investment usually required to jo in  a fund is  $5,000-$50,000. 
Since 1975, there are more than one dozen funds in operation with 
asse ts  of $50 mil l ion.
The portion of the public th a t  enters  in to  futures speculation
must have knowledge of the futures trading elements. There are four
general market pr inc ipals  concerning management of c a p i ta l .  One 
should (1) become conservative as p ro f i t s  increase,  (2) keep to a t r a d ­
ing plan, (3) take a vacation when the account swells from winnings, 
and (4) d ivers ify  r i sk  by trading in mult iple  contracts  (Hamilton, 1979).
Before a small speculator enters  into  fu tures  t rad ing ,  many
d e ta i l s  must be considered and worked out. A most important f i r s t  
step is  to choose a futures  commission merchant wisely before one com­
mences to t rade.  A second step i s  charting one’s equity. A formerly 
mentioned t r ad e r ,  R. E. McMaster J r . , regular ly  charts his equity versus 
time on a graph. He looks fo r  psychological evidence of pride as his  
equity increases.  By charting his equity ,  McMaster believes he keeps 
a handle on his pride and greed and, thus,  he stays in touch with him­
s e l f  (Hamilton, 1979).
Economic Benefits of Speculation
Before discussing economic benefi ts  th a t  accrue to an economy 
through speculat ion, a fa l lac ious  assumption must be c l a r i f i e d .  This
assumption concerns the d i s t in c t ion  between the two primary p a r t i c i ­
pants of futures markets: hedgers and speculators . Although hedging
and speculating often are designated as two d i s t i n c t  a c t i v i t i e s ,  th is  
is  not the case. Hedging and speculation are  differences in degrees 
of kind. Speculation involves predictions of  d i rec t ion  in price f lu c ­
tuat ions in futures market contrac ts .  Hedging involves speculating 
on the basis .  The basis (difference between spot price in the cash 
market and nearby fu tures  price)  i s  less  v o la t i l e  than the spot price 
in price movement. The cash and futures prices  tend to move in the 
same d i rec t ion .  Thus a hedger's exposure to spot price r i sk  can be 
reduced by t ransactions in fu tures  markets because basis r i s k  i s  less 
than spot price r i sk .
Hedgers who are long cash, short  fu tu res ,  or vice versa specu­
la t e  on the price re la t ionsh ip  between cash and futures  pr ices .
The process of hedging divides the process of speculation into two 
parts: price level and price relationship. . . . Because hedging
is extensively practiced by people who market commodities for 
which there are futures markets, futures become the central focus 
and pricing point of the system. Futures prices represent the 
general level of the price, and the multitude of cash prices that 
exist at any given time are established in relation to the 
futures (.Hieronymus, 1971:150) .
Hedgers are in the business of making p r o f i t s .  I t  i s  generally agreed 
upon by futures industry professionals  th a t  hedgers take out more than 
they put in.
A speculator contemplates the future  and reaches conclusions 
about future  price expecta tions. I f  a speculator  expects prices to 
increase,  a long (buying) posit ion i s  taken; i f  a price decrease is  
perceived, a short  ( se l l ing )  posi t ion i s  i n i t i a t e d  in fu tures  con­
t r a c t s .  Speculation involves forecasting pr ice changes. Thomas
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Hieronymus summed the re la t ionsh ip  between hedgers and speculators as 
follows:
The speculators are long the amount the hedgers are short,and short 
the amount the hedgers are long. Hedgers, being long cash and 
short futures or vice versa do nothing more than act as custodians. 
As far as prices are concerned, they are null— enuchs, fit only 
to guard the harem. They act in their storage operations in 
response to basis behavior but fundamentally their actions are 
determined by the speculators whose actions influence the basis 
that influences hedging (Hieronymus, 1971:142).
The economic benefi ts  of speculation have been studied by 
respected futures  markets experts such as Holbrook Working * Roger 
Gray, David Rutledge, Mark Powers, Thomas Hieronymus, and Hendrick 
Houthakker. These experts have agreed on three major economic 
advantages of speculation:  (1) r i s k ' s h i f t i n g  opportunity fo r  hedgers
is  feas ib le  because of speculat ion, (2) speculation enhances market 
l iq u id i ty ,  and (3) price  v o l a t i l i t y  i s  dampened by speculative actions.
By accepting the spot price th a t  r i sk  hedgers are  seeking to 
minimize, speculators f u l f i l l  one of two economic functions mandated 
by the Commodity Exchange Act. The passage s t a te s  tha t  futures  t r an s ­
actions
are, or reasonably can be expected to be utilized by producers, 
merchants, or consumers, engaged in handling such commodity 
(.including the products, by-products, or source thereof) , in 
interstate (including foreign) commerce as a means of hedging 
themselves against possible loss through fluctuations in price 
(Standard and Poor's 500 Stock Index Futures, 1980:27).
Hedging is  possible because documentation has shown th a t  specu­
la to r s  are on the other side of most hedging contracts .  Hedgers mini­
mize the price r i sk  of ownership by sh i f t in g  the r i sk  to those wil ling 
and able to bear the r i sk .  Speculators are not a l t r u i s t i c  in th e i r  
endeavors but assume r i sk  fo r  potentia l  p r o f i t .  To the extent  th a t  a
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commercial hedger cannot eliminate r i sk  from f luc tua t ing  spot p r ices ,  
i t  will be affixed to the product cost .  The cost  ul t imately will be 
borne by consumers; there fo re ,  a c i r c le  i s  created by the futures pro­
cess. Hedging techniques reduce marketing costs .  Speculation f a c i l i ­
ta tes  hedging which enables the spot market fo r  commodities to function 
more e f f i c i e n t ly .  The consumers of s torable  or-nonstorable commodities 
eventually are the winners.
Speculators provide l iq u id i ty  to fu tures  markets. Market 
l iq u id i ty  has two aspects:  marketabi l i ty  and ce r ta in ty  of price. 
Marketabili ty re fe rs  to the ease associated with an a s s e t ' s  disposal .
The e a s ie r  i t  is  to t r a n s fe r  ownership of a fu tures  contrac t ,  the 
more a t t r a c t iv e  i t  is  to potent ia l  market pa r t ic ip an ts .  Thus market­
a b i l i t y  contr ibutes to the l iq u id i ty  of a futures contract  market.
Certainty of price e n ta i l s  the grea ter  the degree of  cer ta in ty  
of an a s s e t ' s  value, the more l iquid  the market. Speculators a f fe c t  
l iq u id i ty  by improving the accuracy for  which forward prices fo re ­
cas t  futures pr ices .  This reduces uncertainty of an a s s e t ' s  yalue 
by augmenting the so l id i ty  of forward pr ices .
The business of speculators— indeed, their comparative advantage—  
lies in forecasting price developments. . . . The effects of 
speculation improve the informational context of forward prices 
and enhance, the confidence attached to forward prices as estimates 
of future spot price (Burns, .1979:45) .
The more speculation present in a contract  traded on an 
exchange, the g rea te r  the l iq u id i ty  of the contract .  This, in turn ,  
improves the ease .of  entry and e x i t  in contrac ts .  Proposals to curb 
speculation would create  an imbalance in the l iqudi ty  of contracts  and 
aid the creation of d isorderly markets.
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Speculation suppresses pr ice v o l a t i l i t y .  Since the 1940s, 
speculation has been suspected by l e g i s la to r s  as spurring price f lu c ­
tuat ions .  This premise is  incorrect .  Hedging a c t iv i ty  in futures con­
t r a c t s  creates buying and se l l in g  pressures.  Without speculative 
a c t iv i ty  to counterbalance hedging, pr ices would be more susceptib le  
to wide f luc tua t ions .  The trend toward more price  v o l a t i l i t y  in specu­
la t iv e  scarce markets is supported by data collected by the Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). In periods of inactive  speculation,  
prices are more e r r a t i c .
The CFTC requires a l l  t raders  who have a large share of open 
in t e r e s t  in futures contracts  to report  t h e i r  posit ions and iden t i fy  
themselves as speculators or hedgers. The data co l lec ted  by the CFTC 
are useful to determine the performance of futures markets based on 
the conduct of t raders .  Empirical evidence of how futures trading 
a ffec ts  cash prices i s  l imited ,  but s tudies  done on the v a r i a b i l i t y  of 
potato, wheat, and onion cash prices report  a reduction in price  vola­
t i l i t y  with the existence of futures contracts: for  these commodities 
(Tomek, 1981).
Futures and cash prices tend to be simultaneously determined.
This observation,  combined with s tud ies  by David Rutledge of 136 futures 
contracts  exploring the re la t ionsh ip  between volume of speculation and 
futures p r ice s ,  supported the premise th a t  speculation does not induce 
variable  cash pr ices .  A causal re la t io n  between price  v o l a t i l i t y  and 
speculation was not found in 134 of the contracts  studied.  Rutledge 
in te rpre ted  these findings as evidence th a t  speculation does not contr ib­
ute to price v a r i a b i l i t y ,  i t  is  a react ion to price v a r i a b i l i t y  (Tomek, 
1981).
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"Speculation also may influence resource a l loca t ion  ind i rec t ly  
by a ss i s t in g  hedgers in the mobilization of cap i ta l"  (Tomek, 1981:15).
A farmer who has a hedged posi t ion in the futures  market may be able to 
borrow more capi ta l  against  the hedged posi t ion than against  an 
unhedged posi t ion .  Seminars are held throughout the country, sponsored 
by the exchanges, to educate agr icu l tu ra l  bankers in the usefulness of 
hedging (Besant, 1981).
Futures markets allow hedgers to make decisions about th e i r  
inventories from year  to year.. Hedgers can improve the a l locat ion  of 
t h e i r  inventories over time with the ass is tance  of futures markets. 
Improved a l loca t ion  of resources through futures  reduces annual price 
var ia t ion .  Speculators afford hedgers an opportunity to move stocks 
in and out of inventory by providing l iq u id i ty  to futures contracts .  
Speculators assess the inventory requirements of hedgers and base th e i r  
trading decisions on these assessments (Tomek, 1981).
In endeavoring to explore the pr ice  e f fec ts  of fu tures  specu­
la t io n ,  two issues must be considered: (1) the level o f  hedging in the
futures contract  and (2) accommodation of the hedging posi t ion by specu­
la to rs  (Peck, 1977).1 I f  hedgers can adjust  the supply and demand of 
t h e i r  products through futures t ransac t ions ,  speculation is  adequate. 
Speculators accommodate hedgers by ant ic ipa t ing  inventory requirements: 
and re f le c t in g  th is  appraisal in futures t ransac t ions .  Hedgers are 
wil l ing to pay successful speculators a ra te  of  return for  th is  service.
Roger Gray, "Price Effects of a Lack, of Speculation," Selected 
Writings on Futures Markets, Vol. II, Readings in Futures Markets, ed. 
A. E. Peck (Chicago, 111.: Board of Trade of the City of Chicago,
1977) , p p . .  19,1-207.
Chapter 3
GOVERNMENTAL REGULATION OF FUTURES MARKETS
Early Legislation
The f i r s t  congressional b i l l  to regulate  futures markets was 
introduced in 1884. By 1921, more than 200 b i l l s  involving regula­
t ion of futures markets or prohibit ing them had been introduced.
During these years ,  futures trading was subject  to public c r i t ic i sm  
and governmental concern over the impacts on commercial producers and 
consumers. In response to public concern, the Future Trading Act was 
passed by Congress in 1921. The Supreme Court ruled the a c t  unconsti­
tu tional  in May 1922 because, in the c o u r t ' s  opinion, the ac t  was an 
i l l e g a l  use of Congress' taxing power.
The passage of the Grain Futures Act of 1922 came on the heels
of the Supreme Court 's rul ing of uncons t i tu t iona l i ty  of the f i r s t
attempt by Congress to l e g i s l a t e  market regulation.  The Grain futures
Act has i t s  base in the commerce clause of the Consti tution.  In th is
a c t ,  Congress se t  up a commission headed by the Secretary of Agriculture, 
the Secretary of Commerce, and the Attorney General. The commission's 
powers were to require contract  markets to keep records of t ransac t ions ,  
compile daily  reports on volume of t rading and open i n t e r e s t ,  and com­
p i le  reports on large posi t ion t raders .  From th is  pool of f a c t s ,  the 
commission based i t s  regulatory a c t i v i t i e s .
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Section 3, the roost important in the a c t ,  has had the g rea tes t  
impact on congressional opinions of futures markets since 1922. I t  is  
considered the keystone of market regulat ion. At the time section 3 
was w r i t ten ,  Representative E l l i s  believed i t  served one purpose 
only—to convince Chief Jus t ice  Taft and the other  just ices;  tha t  the 
b i l l  was cons t i tu t io n a l .
The evidence before the House, on this, particular bill anyway, 
consisted, basically, of the solicitor of the TJSDA saying that 
the legislation was written to be constitutional, and that litj 
had included those "facts" in section 3 for that reason and that 
reason alone. A Mr, Wells of Minneapolis— a vice-president of 
Peavey & Company— had pointed out to the Committee, however: "I
fail to find in the record any testimony from men of experience 
that transactions are extremely susceptible to speculation, 
manipulation, and control" (Stassen, 1981:40).
Section 3 is  the foundation on which the futures industry is
regulated. I t  t e l l s  us th a t
transactions in commodities . . . known as. 'futures’ are affected 
with a national public interest. "They are carried on in large 
volume." The "prices involved are generally quoted and dissemi­
nated," etc. Section 3 goes on to declare, however, that "the 
transactions and prices of commodities on . . .  boards of trade 
are susceptible to speculation, manipulation, and control, and 
sudden.or unreasonable fluctuations in the prices thereof fre­
quently occur as a result of such speculation, manipulation, or 
control, which are detrimental to the producer or the consumer 
and the persons handling commodities . . . and such fluctuations, 
in prices are an obstruction to and a burden upon interstate com­
merce . . . and render regulation imperative for the protection of 
such commerce and the national public interest therein (.Stassen, 
1981:34}.
With a legacy such as t h i s ,  i s  i t  any wonder th a t  speculation is  
viewed as a harmful a c t iv i ty  by the average reader of sect ion 3? By 
es tab l ish ing  th is  sect ion in the guise of i n t e r s t a t e  commerce which 
Congress: oversees, speculation in one f e l l  swoop was condemned as a
t ransac t ion ,  on the boards of t rade ,  which impeded the flow of
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i n t e r s t a t e  commerce. The ac t  has been renamed since 1922, but sect ion 
3 has not been changed.
Hearings began on the Grain Futures Act on June 22, 1922.
Mr. Rainey, a Representative from I l l i n o i s  who opposed the b i l l ,  com­
plained tha t  the b i l l  was reported out of the Agricul tural  Committee 
in the House without being fu l ly  considered by the committee. The 
b i l l  was not read before the Committee of the Whole of the House and 
the b i l l  passed without receiving a quorum. Thus a law was made in 
the 1920s--a law th a t  s t i l l  governs a $2 t r i l l i o n  industry in the 
1980s.
The Commodity Exchange Act
The Grain Futures Act was renamed the Commodity Exchange Act 
(CEA) in 1936.
The fundamental purpose of the Commodity Exchange Act is to 
insure fair practice aiid honest dealing on the commodity exchanges 
and to provide a measure of control over those forms of speculative 
activity which too often demoralize the markets to the injury of 
producers and consumers and the exchanges themselves. (.Campbell, 
1957-1958:223).
I t  seems paradoxical th a t  the purpose of the CEA is  to promote honest 
dealing on the exchanges but tha t  the foundation of regulation was 
l eg is la ted  in a less- than-honest  manner. Nevertheless, the CEA's pur­
pose i s  to promote orderly trading on the futures  exchanges and pro tec t  
commercial hedgers and consumers from speculators .
The Commodity Exchange Authority was s e t  up as an agency under the 
U.S. Department of Agriculture to administer the ac t .  The ac t  was 
intended to strengthen the law regarding futures  markets. Thus the
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act  of June 15, 1936 was renamed the Commodity Exchange Act, but i t  
retained section 3 as par t  of the s t a tu te s .
The Commodity Exchange Authority was given the power to se t  
t rading l im i ts .  Different  trading l imits  were applied to d i f fe ren t  
commodities. These trading l im i ts  do not apply to bona f ide  hedging 
transac t ions .  The ac t  gave the Secretary of Agriculture the authori ty  
to designate boards of trade as contract  markets i f  they met cer ta in  
conditions and requirements. The duties of contract  markets include 
establ ish ing  bylaws, record keeping, allowing for  inspection o f  books 
and records a t  a l l  times by the U.S. Department of Agricul ture 's  
representives or the U.S. Department of Ju s t i c e ,  and se t t ing  delivery 
requirements. Contract markets have a duty to ensure tha t  daily busi­
ness remains orderly . The act  requires fu ture  commission merchants 
and f loor  brokers to r e g i s t e r  with the Secretary of Agriculture.
The CEA also prohibited manipulation of the markets, but i t  has 
not defined manipulation. "Consequently, uncertainly and imprecision 
have resul ted  as courts and administrat ive agencies have sought to d i s ­
tinguish between legi t imate  trading a c t iv i ty  and manipulation" (Harring­
ton, 1981:252). This f a i lu r e  to pinpoint an objective standard to 
measure possible f indings of manipulation has caused problems. Usually 
the tendency for  outsiders of the fu tures  industry has been to associate  
only speculation with manipulation. Congress in ten t iona l ly  l e f t  out 
a de f in i t ion  of manipulation—i t  is  for  the courts to decide.
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The Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission Act
On October 23, 1974, President Ford signed in to  law P.L. 93-463 
e n t i t l e d  "Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974" (CFTC Act). 
The CFTC Act i s  a major overhaul of .the CEA. From 1964-1974, trading 
volume on the twelve organized exchanges increased 400 percent (there 
now are eleven organized exchanges). The CEA, an agr icu l tu ra l  b i l l ,  
had become archaic.  The def in i t ion  of commodities under the old ac t  
had become outdated. None of the new Contracts in foreign currency 
or the proposed GNMA futures contract  sponsored by the Chicago Board 
of Trade were covered under the old act .
The futures industry wanted to expand into  nonfood futures 
t rad ing .  Congress was under public pressure to inves t iga te  whether 
futures trading was responsible for  the r i s in g  cost  of food. Congress 
viewed the futures  markets in t h e i r  t r ad i t io na l  ag r icu l tu ra l  ro le ,  
thus i t  centered on food prices and marketing. The futures industry 
rea l ized tha t  i t s  ag r icu l tu ra l  role  was diminishing and evolying into 
contracts  in nonfood areas such as the aforementioned foreign currency 
contract  and others such as s i l v e r ,  lumber, and numerous contract  
proposals.
Because a regulatory gap exis ted in those futures  not named 
in the CEA futures industry ,  o f f i c i a l s  f e l t  th a t  scandals would a r i se  
because "antifraud provisions of the Act, and the important requ ire ­
ment th a t  a l l  customer funds must be segregated from the brokers'  
own funds, were inapplicable" (Johnson, 1976:4). Congress and the 
futures industry were anxious to see the CEA revamped.
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The CFTC Act has a d i rec t  impact on speculators:
Section 4a of the Commodity Exchange Act authorizes the Com­
mission to establish limits on the number of contracts a specu­
lative trader may hold, directly or indirectly, individually or 
with others through an express or implied agreement or understand­
ing. Persons engaged in "bona fide hedging transactions" are not 
subject to this prohibition (Schief and Markham, 1978-1979:50).
The speculative trading l im its  were establ ished in 1936; 
however, the CFTC Act contains new enforcement provisions. Speculators 
found in v io la t ion  of section 4a are subject  to  a $100,000 f ine  for  
each vio la t ion  or a 6- to 10-year j a i l  sentence. I f  speculators  trade 
in concert ,  they will be t rea ted  as one posit ion fo r  purposes of the 
trading report  l im i t .  The CFTC may a lso  publish findings of an in v e s t i ­
gation (some r e s t r i c t i o n s  do apply to the publ ica t ions) .  The commission 
has, in the past ,  published the posi t ion of speculators who violated 
speculative l im i ts .
There are two major changes in the agency tha t  regulate  futures;: 
(1) the Commodity Futures Trading Commission is  s e t  up as an independent 
regulatory agency with exclusive ju r i s d ic t io n  over contracts  dealing 
in futures and (2) the CFTC is  par t  of the sunset regulatory agencies.
In other  words, the CFTC was given the authori ty  over futures  markets 
for  four years beginning in 1974 and ending in 1978. In 1978, hearings 
were held on CFTC to judge whether i t  should continue to e x is t  as a 
regulatory body. The CFTC was reauthorized by Congress un t i l  1982 and 
will be subject  to future  reauthorizat ion in th a t  year .  Every four 
years ,  the CFTC must prove th a t  i t s  pol ic ies  and r e s p o n s ib i l i t i e s  are 
congruent with the congressional mandate.
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The role of the CFTC i s  summarized by Br. Mark Powers.
The new Act strengthens the exchanges * role as quasi-public. ; 
institutions and brings almost all of their activities under 
regulation of the federal government. Every contract market 
(exchange) has to be specifically approved by the Commission. 
Everybody involved in execution of futures contracts and in 
dealing with the public has to be registered with the Commis­
sion and has to pass examinations and fitness requirements 
established by the Commission..' The new Act extends materially 
the concept of the public interest to be protected by including 
not only former interests,:but the interests of all people-— 
producers, processors, merchants, other market users and con­
sumers. (Powers, 1977:245).
Contract approval by the CFTC will be granted only i f  the contracts  
proposed are in the public i n t e r e s t  and i f  they can be j u s t i f i e d  
economically.
The s t ruc tu re  of the CFTC is  unlike previous regulatory 
s t ruc tu re  of futures  markets. The CFTC i s  composed of f ive  commis­
sioners.  One serves as a chairman. The CFTC has three operating 
divis ions and numerous s t a f f  o f f ices .  The President  appoints the 
commissioners with the advice and consent of the Senate. The terms are 
staggered and e x is t  in f ive-year  increments.
The CFTC has two goals: Cl) to pro tec t  the users of the fu tures
markets from abuses and (2) to maintain the economic u t i l i t y  of 
futures markets. The CFTC spent the years 1974-1978 solving the 
problems inherent  in the s ta r t -u p  of an agency. Since 1978, the 
CFTC has d irected more of i t s  a t ten t ion  to enforcement.
The act ions of the CFTC current ly  have been more controversial  
than before 1978. Problems in the CFTC surfaced in the reauthorizat ion 
hearings and drew c r i t ic i sm  from persons in Congress and witnesses 
of the hearings. In the CFTC, Congress has created a regula tor  of 
futures markets with more power and authori ty  than ever before.
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Congress b u i l t  these new laws based on past  laws, but the old laws have 
a shaky foundation.
As mentioned e a r l i e r ,  the CFTC was up fo r  reauthorization in
1978 before Congress. Hearings were held by committees in the House
and Senate th a t  had ju r i s d ic t io n  over the CFTC.
The basic complaint against the CFTC by persons in the futures 
industry was that the commission attempted to impose too many 
regulatory initiatives too soon and with little understanding, 
particularly at the staff level, of the subtleties of the futures 
market (Young, 1978:876).
The problems experienced by the CFTC were from internal  and 
external sources. In te rn a l ly ,  the CFTC suffered from a high turnover 
of key personnel, inadequate funding, and poor administrat ion.  
Externally, the CFTC was challenged by the Securi t ies  Exchange 
Commission 's bid to seek ju r i sd ic t io n  over f inancial  fu tures .  The 
U.S. Treasury a lso wanted to have some impact on the trading of govern­
ment s e cu r i t ie s  fu tures .
Robert Wilmouth, president of the Chicago Board of Trade, 
and Walter Brinkman, president  of the Board of Trade Clearing Corpora­
tion.,, t e s t i f i e d  in favor of revoking the CFTC's independent s ta tus  
and placing i t  back under the U.S. Department o f  Agriculture.  Other 
futures industry o f f i c i a l s  believed the CFTC's independent s ta tus  
should remain in ta c t  and supported i t s  exclusive ju r i s d ic t io n  over 
futures markets to be extended for  another four years .
At the conclusion of the hearings, the CFTC was extended fo r  
four more years ;  i t  is  being reviewed again now. The reauthorizat ion 
of the CFTC hearings will be along the same format as those in 1978, 
with a d ifference:  the new hearings will present more controversy
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between opposing factions of the CFTC's perceived role  as the sole 
regulator  of futures t ransactions than in 1978.
Some important changes were made in the CFTC during the 1978 
reauthorization process.
1. Permit the CFTC Chairman to serve at the President's 
pleasure.
2. Suspend commodity options trading pending CFTC documen­
tation of its ability to regulate such transaction.
3. Provide additional subpoena power to the CFTC.
4. Authorize states to bring action seeking injunctive 
relief.for violations of the Commodity Exchange Act or CFTC 
rules and regulations.
5. Revise penalties for fraudulent industry practices and 
CFTC regulatory violations.
6. Require CFTC consultation with Treasury Department, Secure 
ities Exchange Commission and the Federal Reserve Board regarding 
certain transactions (Congressional Information Service, May 15, 
1978:158).
Par t icu la r ly  important are changes 4 and 6. These two areas came to 
the front  in 1982 and questions of ju r i s d ic t io n  were ra ised .  As of 
th is  date , they are not being s e t t l e d .
Since the reau thor iza t ion ,  the act ions of the CFTC from 1979- 
1982 have been highly publicized. Dubious pub l ic i ty  was garnered 
in March 1980 over the s i l v e r  futures market near collapse. At tha t  
time, journal and d a i l i e s  such as The Economist, Forbes, Business Week,  
Dun's Review, Barron's, and the Walt S tr e e t  Journal reported the c i r ­
cumstances leading to the near collapse and offered respective opinions 
as to how th is  c r i s i s  arose.  Blame was placed upon the CFTC, the 
Chicago Board of Trade, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, and the specu­
la to r s  trading on these exchanges.
The phenomenal growth in the f inancia l  fu tures  and the Kansas 
City Board of Trade's stock index future  contract  in 1982 have brought 
new considerations in the CFTC's ro le  in th is  changing environment.
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The hearings should be in te res t in g  as to in te rp re ta t ion  of the role  of 
the speculator in equity-based futures contracts by the futures industry,  
Congress, the CFTC, and other regulatory agencies.
The commodity leg i s la t io n  handed down from Congress since 1922 
can be likened to a l e t t e r  with po s tsc r ip ts .  Beginning with the 
f i r s t  a c t ,  Congress has passed amendments, banned trading on onion 
futures in the l a t e  1950s, experienced a major overhaul of the CEA, 
and reached a point where futures regulation will be reviewed every 
four years.  Congress continues to add pos tsc r ip ts  to the foundation 
of l eg i s la t ion  without t inker ing with the keystone la id  in 1922.
Chapter 4
CONGRESSIONAL MISUNDERSTANDING OF SPECULATION
General Misunderstanding
The acquiring o f  knowledge of futures markets would be piece­
meal i f  l e f t  sole ly to newspapers and periodicals  to provide people 
with a basic understanding of futures markets. To be in a s i tua t ion  
to understand futures markets requires reading and researchi ng of the 
topic .  In l ieu  of pursuing the subject  matter on i t s  own, the general 
public allows others to do i t —elected o f f i c i a l s .  The average c i t izen  
may not know how to put a spread on between CDs and treasury bonds, 
but he knows how to pull a voting lever .  Elected o f f i c i a l s  have 
r e s p o n s ib i l i t i e s  toward the general public as described in the Consti­
tu t ion .  Their main obl igat ion is  to pro tec t  the national  public 
in te r e s t .  Futures markets are in keeping with national  public i n t e r e s t ,  
therefore  Congress regulated futures markets as a matter of public 
policy.
What i f  the average congressman does not understand the futures 
markets any b e t te r  than his cons t i tu ten ts?  Congress has committees.
The House and the Senate members assign th e i r  numbers to committees 
of various subject  matter to allow members to concentrate on selected 
issues.  What t ransp ires  i f  committee members do not fu l ly  understand 
the issues being studied by th e i r  committee? A c l e f t  occurs in the 
process. Bargaining and compromising ensue a t  the committee leve l .
I t  i s  possible for  a minority fac t ion on the committee to bring b i l l s
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through the committee onto the Senate or House f loors .  Therefore some 
members on the committee may not possess a complete understanding of 
the specif ics  of a p a r t i cu la r  b i l l .
I t  is  postulated th a t  th i s  i s  how the futures  l eg i s la t ion  
was made into law. A small aggregate of congressmen were responsible 
for  guiding the premier futures leg i s la t io n  through Congress without 
the to ta l  body understanding the supposition of  futures markets.
This handful of congressional members had an antispeculation prejudice 
which stemmed from th e i r  misunderstanding of futures markets. An 
antispeculat ion bias was consequently embedded in the foundation of the 
f i r s t  futures s t a tu t e s .  This predicament has been extended in suc­
ceeding amendments.
The re su l ts  of misunderstanding by the l eg i s l a to r s  continues 
to the present  day. Robert K. Wilraouth, pres ident  of the Chicago 
Board of Trade, sa id ,
There is, and I emphasize this, a total lack of understanding 
of the futures markets in Washington, D.C., almost from the top 
level right on down to the lowest clerk in Washington. We were 
confronted recently with a number of queries from various con­
gressmen and their staffs, essentially saying they felt there ought 
not to be any short sales, any short speculation on the CBT iChicago 
Board of Trade], unless we could prove their validity. We were for­
tunate enough to call Roger Gray and David Rutledge from Stanford 
to put together very hurriedly, within a matter of about 48 or 72 
hours a paper on short speculation and the values of it (Wilmouth., 
1981:2).
I f  the l e g i s la to r s  and th e i r  s t a f f s  understood fu tu res  markets and 
th e i r  re la t ion  to o ther  markets, t h i s  never would have been proposed.
I t  i s  t rue  th a t  in any s i tu a t ion  where a person lacks back­
ground in the subject  matter  of  an issue ,  any ins ight  provided by an
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expert opinion or. journal a r t i c l e  wil l contr ibute  to the person's  
ed if ica t io n .  People accumulate knowledge to fu r the r  t h e i r  understand­
ing o f  a d isc ip l ine  and i t s  relatedness to the whole community. Futures 
markets are a part  of th a t  community and speculation is  an aspect of 
futures'  trading. Some persons may have a surface understanding of 
speculation,  but th a t  is not su f f i c i e n t  to  lend true ins igh t  in to  the 
a c t iv i t y .  Insight  into speculative a c t iv i t y  i s  necessary in order to 
see i t s  value to the whole arena of fu tures  t rading.  Insight  can be 
gained by perceiving the role of the speculator  and placing i t  in per­
spective.
The limited understanding of speculation was recent ly  demon­
s t ra te d  in a congressional hearing. The scene was the Senate Committee 
on Agriculture,  Nutr i t ion ,  and Forestry . The witness was James Stone, 
the proposed nominee to chair  the CFTC in 1979. The l ine  of quest ion­
ing probed Mr. Stone's grasp of  futures markets. The congressman
questioning Mr. Stone in the following passage was Senator Leahy.
Senator Leahy mentioned to Mr. Stone th a t  he had read extensively 
about futures markets and had visited,many of the eleven exchanges.
Senator Leahy; I realized as I think my colleagues did, that while 
we don't claim any greater or lesser intelligence
than the average person we represent here, we had
only begun to scratch the surface of a very complex 
market. There are people that have been in the 
business for 20 years and they told me that they 
are just beginning to learn it, and many of these 
people are very successful. Have you ever visited 
the floor of any exchange?
Hr. Stone. I have never been on.the floor of an exchange. I
have been in the gallery of the Chicago Board of 
Trade.
Senator Leahy. Have you ever talked with the people that trade on 
the floor? Have you a sense of the competition 
there?
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Mr. Stone. I have not, Senator. (.U.S., Congress, Senate,
Hearing, April 4, 1979:26).
Senator Leahy acknowledged the complexity of the fu tures  mar­
kets and recognized the importance of understanding the industry par­
t i c ip a n t s .  Yet Mr. Stone had never conversed with a f lo o r  t rader  as 
par t  of his preparat ion fo r  a possible  appointment to the CFTC. Although 
the Senate committee l a t e r  r a t i f i e d  Mr. Stone's nomination, i t  appears 
t h a t  a problem was exhibited in the passage. The problem was not new.
Was i t  presumtuous to have expected Mr. Stone to speak with f loor  
t raders  of the industry t h a t  he was to regulate? This is  doubtful.  
Certainly Mr. Stone could have gained some ins ight  into the specula tors '  
perception of t h e i r  ro le  and how thatrperception affected futures  t r ad ­
ing .
The Gambling Myth
The tex ts  of commodity leg i s la t io n  since 3921 are r ep le te  with 
examples of  Congress linking speculation in futures markets with gam­
bling. This legacy has aided in perpetuating the notion th a t  specu­
la to rs  are an unscrupulous l o t .  The speculation-gambling l ink was. most 
popular in the 1920s and 1930s when Congress was developing s ta tu te s  
on commodity regulation.  Since then, the associat ion has moderated 
somewhat as Congress focuses on other  damaging a c t iv i ty  in which spec­
u la tors  engage--manipulation of p r ices .  Nevertheless, the gambling bias; 
has remained and i t  is  evident in today's  congressional committee hear­
ings.
The next passage can be credi ted  to Senator Capper's orat ion 
before the Senate in 1921. A review of t h i s  and other passages
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recorded in the U.S. CongressionalRecord  and committee hearings since 
the f i r s t  regulatory ac t  unt i l  the present i s  proof of the gambling 
bias .
The Future Trading Act of 1921 had a wil l ing sponsor in Sena­
to r  Capper of Kansas. The speech he made in reference to the b i l l  was 
delivered when the populism movement was a l ive  and harborers of 
populism resided in Washington, D.C. Senator Capper was known for  
his dazzling public speaking.
Mr. President, it is nothing new that we hear today from the 
producers of food, from.grain dealers and millers, and from vic­
tims of speculation carried on without restriction, of the abomi­
nation of speculations in these basic products. . . . During the 
past year the price of wheat and corn has been determined to a 
large extent hot by the demand and supply of the commodity itself 
but by the fabulous quantities sold on the exchange that never 
had any existence, that no grain farmer in the world ever planted, 
ever toiled over its cultivation and harvest, or offered for sale.
. . . Mr. President, it is against the law to run a gambling 
house anywhere within the United States. But today under the 
cloak of business respectability, we are permitting the biggest 
gambling hall in the world to be operated on the Chicago Board 
of Trade. The grain gamblers have made.the exchange building in 
Chicago the world's greatest gambling house. Monte Carlo or the 
Casino at Habana are not to be compared with it.. . .. .Mr. Presi­
dent,, .every member ;of a grain exchange who testified before the 
Agricultural Committee of the Senate acknowledged that there is 
at times excessive speculation and undesirable speculation in the 
futures market. It was brought out that a few big traders at times 
influence prices— manipulate the market— -by the great volume of 
their operations. Also it was shown that a continually fluctuat­
ing, and not a stable, market is the desire of the speculators.
. . . The plain truth, Mr. President, is that through manipulation 
of the market the big speculators on the Chicago Board of Trade 
are undoubtedly a powerful factor in fixing the price of the
farmer's wheat. . . .  I fear this country will not long continue
to produce the finest wheat in the world if we continue to let the 
wheat gambler fix the price (U.S., Congressional Record, Vol. 16,
4761, 4763, 4768, August 9, 1921).
Senator Capper's l eg i s la t io n  was declared unconstitutional  in May 
1922. Congress, however, was not to be denied. Forty days hence, a
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new b i l l  was drawn up with i t s  s t a tu te s  based in findings of f a c t .  The 
s t a f f  of the House Agricultural Committee researched the issues and 
b l i th e ly  ignored views of expert testimony presented in congressional 
hearings. From where were the findings of fac t  drawn? I f  a s t a f f  
member of the Agricultural Committee had read a congressional report  
prepared in 1890, a l e g i s l a t iv e  de f in i t ion  would have added knowledge 
to his fac ts  in re la t io n  to
"options," defined as future contract in which delivery is not 
required, and "futures" defined as the sale of a commodity not 
owned by the seller at the time of the sale, that obviously those 
who deal in ’’options" and "futures" contracts, which is mere 
gambling, no matter by what less offensive name such transactions 
may be designated, neither add to the purpose by their calling, 
but on the contrary. They speculate in fictitious products 
(Campbell, 1957-1958:219).
Apparently these solemn declarat ions of economic fac ts  by Congress
were good enough for  the Supreme Court. The Grain Futures Act became
law in 1922.
The mistake of linking the role  of a speculator  with tha t  of 
a gambler continued into the 1930s. Prior to the 1936 passage of the 
CEA, the usual process of congressional hearings on the issue were 
held. The l ine  of questioning th a t  follows occurred in the Committee 
of Agriculture and Forestry in the Senate, 1st  sess ion,  April 1936.
The discussion was between Senator Norris and a witness,  Mr. Vesecky:
Senator Norris. You would call that gambling?
Mr. Vesecky. You might call it gambling or speculation.
Senator Norris. I am not one who objects to speculation in a
modified way. I think that it is probably legiti­
mate. I think, as a matter of fact, that when a 
man buys wheat for future delivery in. a sense he 
is a speculator because he doesn’t know what the 
price is going to be when the time comes, but if 
he buys without reference to the handling of the
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commodity itself, just goes in and buys and sells 
without reference to anything, is he a hedger or a 
gambler?
Mr. Vesecky. He is not a hedger at all. He is either politely
called a speculator or otherwise might be called 
a gambler, whichever one you want to call him.
Senator Norris. If that were prohibited by law, prevented in any 
way, lis itj your idea that it will have a bene­
ficial effect upon the market generally?
Mr. Vesecky. I think if excessive speculation> excessive long
lines or short lines— either one— and excessive 
sales and purchases on any one day are limited or 
prohibited, that it will have a beneficial effect 
on the market. It was proven several times during 
the last big flurry in July 1933, that it was the 
creation of these long lines at one time that made 
the bad break (Hieronymus, 1971:139).
In th is  exchange, one rea l izes  the confusion over the role  of 
the speculator .  A hedger is  legit imized by his underlying posit ion in 
the cash market fo r  the commodity and his speculation on the basis is  
acceptable because of th is  reference to the tangible  commodity. Senator 
Norris did not understand buying and se l l in g  in futures  contracts  with­
out a reference to the cash market. He has a d i f f i c u l t  time under­
standing how one could ,sel l  something he did not own or buy something he 
did not want. This idea, one of the basic elements of fu tures  t rading,  
can be traced to the f i r s t  s e t  of  trading rules  estab l ished  by the 
Chicago Board of Trade in 1865. Senator Norris was confused by th is  notion 
and wondered i f  trading of th is  nature should be prohibited.
Mr. Vesecky answered th a t  the imposition of the speculative 
posit ion and trading l im its  would be beneficial  to the markets. This 
l ine  of reasoning is  detrimental to the economic usefulness of futures 
markets. Congress, a t  the time of t h i s  hearing, understood the 
futures markets'  existence as a r i sk - t r an s fe r r in g  mechanism for
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commercial users who are subject  to r isks  from economic and external 
fac to rs .  Congress' a t t i tu d e  toward speculat ion, since speculators ;  
have no physical commodity to de l iver  into the cash market, is  tha t  
speculators are responsible for  f luc tua t ion  in d isrupt ive  prices tha t  
impede the orderly  flow of the markets. Thomas Hieronymus (1971), 
a widely respected economist and authori ty  on futures  markets, said 
th i s  a t t i tu d e  f a i l s  to recognize speculation in price  formation which, 
in turn ,  means Congress does not understand the role  of pricing in 
the economic system. For example, in the Jo in t  Committee of the 
Economic Report in December 1947, Representative Rich asked the 
administrator  of the Commodity Exchange Authority how Congress "could 
stop speculation and l e t  the legi t imate  trading p e r s i s t  (Hieronymus, 
1971:138).
The speculator in the marketplace f u l f i l l s  v i ta l  economic 
functions th a t  f a c i l i t a t e  trading in basic commodities and f inancial  - 
and in te r e s t  ra te  fu tures .  Hedgers are sh i f t in g  r i sk  to speculators 
who are  wil l ing to ;bear r i sk  fo r  a chance of gain. Research has been 
done in markets th a t  are th in ly  traded and have few speculators .  Roger 
Gray (Peek, 1977)2 found th a t  a lack of speculation increased price 
v o l a t i l i t y .  Speculators who are day t rade rs  and scalpers  dampen price 
swings because they are trading against  the markets. The speculators 
assess price  movement and r i sk  venture capita l  to e s tab l ish  an open 
in t e r e s t  in the d i rec t ion  they feel prices  are moving.
The past  couple of decades have focused anti speculation bias 
on price f luc tua t ion  and manipulation of the markets by speculators .
2 I b i d .
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Some congressmen have had a b e t te r  understanding of futures markets 
than others. When Congress held hearings in 1973 for  b i l l s  submitted 
which would overhaul the Commodity Exchange Act of 1936, Representative 
Poage, chairman of the House Committee on Agriculture in 1973, defended 
speculation. His remarks were made during the discussion of draf t ing 
a new b i l l  t h a t  would become the CFTC Act of 1974.
Representative Poage conceded tha t  few members of Congress 
are fu l ly  aware of the complexities of futures trading and the role 
of the federal government in regulating futures markets. Poage 
b r ie f ly  summarized the h is to ry  of l eg i s la t io n  concerning futures mar­
kets since 1922. In the following discourse, he praised speculation:
Since their inception, the necessary liquidity in contract 
markets has been provided by speculators, or those who have no 
existing cash risk to offset through the purchase or sale of 
futures contracts. Speculators, subject to certain limits as 
provided by the Commodity Exchange Commission, seek to profit 
off the shifts in price levels of the contracts. In so doing, 
they provide a real service to the market and its users, by pro­
viding liquidity (U.S., Congressional Record, Vol. 119, 41332, 
December 13, 1973).
Representative James Whitten, in hearings before a subcommittee 
of the Committee on Appropriations: in 1977, had th is  to say:
My observation from this side of the table has almost conyinced 
me— although I have not dealt with, it personally in any degree at all 
— that the gamblers on the market are. an essential part of market op­
erations. Without then, there could not be any operations on a hedg­
ing basis at all. We have been told through the years that as the 
Government added commodities to regulation, the gamblers then.took to 
what was left out. I think the records will.kind of show that, so I 
would like you to place in the record, the dates when various Commod­
ities were added (U.S., Congress, House, Hearing, March 22, 2977:94).
Does "the gamblers" sound familiar?
Representative Whitten acknowledged tha t  speculators are 
necessary to the legi t imate  hedging ro le ;  he also s ta ted  th a t ,  as
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contract  markets added contracts  based on f inancia l  instruments and 
foreign currency fu tu res ,  speculators (gamblers) rushed in to trade 
because they were not commodities covered by federal Taw. One can 
forget  the economic reasoning behind speculators entering these 
markets; everyone knows tha t  speculators were vea lly  seeking to get 
out from beneath government regulation.
Representative Whitten's 1977 remarks were made in regard to 
the reauthorizat ion of the CFTC. And s t i l l  the trend continues . . . .
The Senate held hearings on the CFTC in 1978 before the Sub­
committee on Agricultural  Research and General Legislation of the 
Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutr i t ion ,  and Forestry. Mr. Leo 
Melamed, a former chairman of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange and 
presently serving as a special  counsel to the exchange, was a witness. 
Mr. Melamed, a t  the request of Senator Hayakawa, explained how the 
futures industry is  highly unique and highly complex. He explained 
the differences between futures  markets and s e cu r i t ie s  to the sub­
committee. Mr. Melamed offered an explanation of the speculative 
trading done in futures markets:
In the field of futures, there is virtually but one nonhedge 
trading technique, and that is for profit— speculation for profit. 
Irrespective of what else you call it, in the futures market if 
you are not a hedger, if you are not risk shifting or attempting 
to preserve or prevent risk, then you are speculating and that 
would be your only reason for going in the futures market; so that 
objective is but one (U.S., Congress, Senate, Hearing, March 21, 
1978:134).
Senator Hayakawa, who questioned Mr. Melamed on his explanation 
of th is  complex area, was extremely g r a t e f u l . He was so grateful  th a t ,  
a t  the end of  his quest ioning, he remarked, "We who are r e t i r e d
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professors of English don ' t  know very much useful in the business 
world. . . .  I am very grateful  to you for  your contr ibution to my 
education" (U.S., Congress, Senate, Hearing, March 21, 1978:137).
The 1980s may well bring the same type of  misunderstanding and 
misinformation of  the specu la tor 's  role  as Congress experienced in the 
past .  In 1980 the same Senate Committee on Agriculture,  Nutr i t ion,  
and Forestry held hearings in regard to the nomination of James 
Stone, potent ial  member of the CFTC and i t s  chairman. These hearings 
were held Shortly a f t e r  the s i l v e r  fu tures  market price v o l a t i l i t y  
episode in March 1980.
Each senator on the committee took a turn questioning Mr. Stone. 
In his f i r s t  quest ion, Senator Melcher asked i f  a cer ta in  amount of 
gambling occurred a t  the exchange. This misunderstanding of  speculation 
i s  d is turbing.  I f  the pub l ic 's  e lected o f f i c i a l s  do not understand 
basic concepts of economic markets th a t  are in the pub l ic 's  i n te r e s t  
(as defined by Congress in T i t l e  7, sect ion 3 of the U.S. Codes), how 
well are these i n te r e s t s  being protected? Not only i s  speculation 
misunderstood, but some other  aspects of futures trading are not c lea r ly  
understood by Congress.
Senator Melcher's other questions to Mr. Stone indicated tha t  
the  senator was unable to iden t i fy  basic fu tures  trading terms.
Senator Melcher. Do you believe the Commission ought to prohibit
trading by commission people on the floor for 
their own account?
Mr, Stone. Should the Commission prohibit dual trading? Is.
that the question?
Senator Melcher. No; trading for their own account by commission
people on the floor^
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Mr. Stone. That practice is often called dual trading and it
raises an issue which needs more facts before it 
can be decided (U.S., Congress, Senate, Hearing, 
April 4, 1979:29).
I f  a senator on the committee, which has ju r i s d ic t io n  over the 
commission which regulates futures markets, cannot iden t i fy  basic 
terminology, one wonders about his  understanding of the purpose of  such 
markets. Dual trading is  a sens i t ive  issue. The more l iquid  a market 
i s ,  the more smoothly i t  functions and aids the ease of entry and ex i t  
of  the market. Prohibiting dual trading would a f f e c t  market l iq u id i ty .  
The consequences of such an action must be considered before an out­
r ig h t  prohibit ion is  imposed.
In surveying the U.S. Congressional Record and congressional
hearings in regard to futures  markets, the problem becomes exceedingly
apparent. Hedging is  considered to be a bona f ide  use of futures
markets and speculation is considered to be a necessary e v i l .
The lack of understanding of the speculator's role is sharply 
revealed when government takes action to "hurt" and "punish" specu­
lators. Their policy decisions reflect a lack of understanding of 
the role of free markets and of speculators' contributions to that 
role (Burns, 1979:113).
As h is tory  has shown, Congress s e t  a precedent for  the l in k  
of speculation to gambling. I t  defined gambling in T i t l e  18 of the 
U.S. Codes:
Gambling in the federal law is defined to include among other 
things pool-selling, book-making, maintaining slot machines, rou­
lette wheels or dice tables, and conducting lotteries, policy, 
bolita or numbers games or selling chances therein (18 TJ.S.C.
§ 1955(b) (2) (1978).
As s ta ted  in federal law, fu tures  trading has no re la t ion  to 
gambling. Gambling may cover more items than those l i s t e d  above, but 
fu tures  are not par t  of them. Federal gambling s t a tu te s  do not
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prohib i t  trading in futures contrac ts .  As f a r  as s t a t e  gambling laws 
are concerned, they are preempted by CFTC-designated futures contracts .  
The CFTC Act of 1974 gave exclusive ju r i s d ic t io n  to the CFTC over 
futures markets. Where s ta te  laws are in co n f l i c t  with federal  law in 
regard to futures markets, the s t a te  laws are superceded by the CFTC 
mandate of exclusive ju r i s d ic t io n .
The people of the United States extol!  competition in economic 
endeavors as a thing of beauty. Competition rewards those who produce 
goods people want; i t  punishes those who produce goods people don ' t  
want. The keystone th a t  synthesizes competition is  the pricing 
mechanism. Every product in a competitive market of  s torable  and 
nonstorable commodities has a price.  Prices f luc tua te  to r e f l e c t  
supply and demand for  these goods.
One of the c h a ra c te r i s t i c s  of pure competitive markets i s  the 
presence of many buyers and s e l l e r s ,  each with l i t t l e  influence on 
pr ice .  Another c h a ra c te r i s t i c  of  pure competition is  th a t  products 
for  the p a r t i c u la r  market are homogeneous. Futures markets meet the 
above requirements for  pure competition.
Contracts on exchanges typ ica l ly  have many buyers and s e l l e r s ,  
thereby reducing the p o ss ib i l i ty  of an individual manipulating the pr ice .  
Futures markets are impersonal. Trading i s  done publicly in the p i t  and 
a l l  pr ice  information is  made public. No secre t  dealings a t  prices  
away from the contract  market are made. Futures trading ru les  fo r  con­
t r a c t s  require the terms to  be standardized.  Standardized contracts  
make for  interchangeable l o t s  o f  equal grade. The clearing corporation 
of each exchange assumes the open in te r e s t  of  each t rade r ,  thus
44
t raders  do not know with which principal  they are dealing because of the 
clearing corpora t ion 's  stance. These conditions must e x is t  before a fu­
tures market can be viable.  An establ ished futures market fo s te rs  compet­
i t i v e  behavior. I t  is  the market imperfections th a t  receive publ ic i ty .
A long-standing concern of Congress, farms, and other members 
of the public is  th a t  speculators manipulate prices too high or too low. 
Roger Gray and David Rutledge, in empirical analyses of futures markets, 
found l i t t l e  evidence th a t  futures  markets are in serious disequilibrium 
over periods of time (Peck, 1977)3 Accusations by the public blaming 
speculators for  price f luc tuat ions  i s  akin to k i l l in g  the messenger who 
brings bad news. Instead of public policy concentrating on improving 
market performance, i t  endeavors to curb speculation through specula­
t iv e  posit ion l im i ts  and ra is ing  margin requirements fo r  speculators .  
People cannot v isua l ize  th a t  speculation fo r  p r o f i t  is  a legit imate 
function of  futures t rading.
A timely example i l l u s t r a t i n g  the problem has been the contro­
versy surrounding the introduction of stock index futures .
There's opposition in seme quarters including Congress, to the 
new market. The main concerns are that stock index futures will 
draw speculators away from stocks, thereby making markets more 
volatile and possibly making it more difficult to underwrite 
equity capital. Funny, isn’t it how speculators in Kansas City 
futures are "bad guys" engaging in the frivolous activity, but the 
same speculators on the New York Stock Exchange are "good guys" 
who provide market liquidity? (Zweig, 1982:26).
Mr. Zweig's point i s  well taken. When the public and Congress 
look, from the vantage point of the ga l lery  over the p i t s ,  they see no 
white hats .  C r i t ic s  of the growth in f inancial  futures contracts, 
breathed a sigh, of r e l i e f  when the New York Futures Exchange opened
3I b i d .
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for  business in 1980--as i f  the associat ion between the New York Futures 
Exchange and the venerable New York Stock Exchange would legit imize the 
success of an industry dominated by two exchanges west of New York City!
Perusing the committee hearings in the Senate perta ining to 
James Stone's nomination as a member and chairman of the CFTC, the 
reader gains ins igh t  into whom Congress i s  blaming for  price v o l a t i l i t y .
Senator Dole. There has been a lot of frustration by the American
fanner, the American producer— in fact, it has been
suggested by some that we abolish the boards of trade 
and probably the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, 
too, because they see it as controlled by speculators 
and controlled by those who would hold down the 
farmer's price. . . .  I think it is fair to say 
there is a strong body of opinion out there in the 
countryside, which you may discover if you continue 
to visit around the country, that feels this entire 
system is designed for one purpose— to call it gam­
bling may not be the correct thing,, but some people
lose and some people make money, and it is all at the
expense of the American producer. I don't know how 
you address that. It is a hard thing to get a handle
on but I think you are probably aware of this con­
cern. It is not shared by everyone but there are a 
number of people:that don't understand how it works 
who are quick to make that judgment. Have you had 
an opportunity to discuss any of these concerns with 
bona fide farmers? (U.S., Congress, Senate, Hearing, 
April 4, 1.979:36) .
Fortunate ly , Mr. Stone could answer Senator Dole's l a s t  question in the 
aff i rmative  because he had spent three days in Iowa doing farm chores 
on a bona f ide  farm th a t  ra ised bona f ide  pigs. He found i t  helpful 
in deepening his understanding of agr icu l tu ra l  commodities.
Senator Dole proceeded to o f fe r  some o f  his ins igh t  into
exchanges. "I have v is i te d  an exchange a few times and I s t i l l  don ' t  
understand what i s  going on. I j u s t  kept my hands down. That i s  the 
f i r s t  thing they t e l l  you" (U. S , , Congress, Senate, Hearing, April 4,
1979:36). Senator Dole's v i s i t  to the exchange f loor  was more than Mr.
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Stone had done thus f a r ;  the reader wil l reca l l  th a t  Mr. Stone had 
never been on the f loor  of an exchange, only in the gallery .
Senator Dole voiced the fears  held by some people th a t  specu­
l a to r s  hold down the farmer 's  pr ice .  Senator Dole said he did not
know how to address th a t  premise. I t  i s  obvious th a t  Senator Dole 
did not know how a speculator functions in fu tures  trading or he 
could have discussed the issue with those who fear  speculators pro­
f i t  a t  the expense of a producer. I f  members of the Senate committee
which oversees the CFTC cannot respond to charges th a t  speculators 
manipulate p r ice s ,  they do not understand futures markets.
Manipulation of a futures price is  to abnormally depress or 
ra i se  the pr ice  outside the normal influences of supply and demand.
I t  i s  said th a t  manipulation occurred in the March 1979 wheat contract  
and the s i l v e r  market in 1980. In order fo r  a t rader  to manipulate 
p r ices ,  large f inancial  resources are required. Even then, i f  he 
manipulates a p r i c e ' i n  his favor ,  he encounters a problem. When 
the t rader  moves to p r o f i t  from the manipulation, prices often move to 
t h e i r  former leve l .  The probabi l i ty  of successful manipulation is  
therefore  small.
Market corners,  a form of manipulation, are establ ished when 
a t rader  has possession of a large amount of a deliverable  supply in 
the cash market and holds a major portion of the long posit ion in the 
re la ted  futures market. Thus the t rader  who has the long open in te r e s t  
corners; the shorts in the delivery month. Traders who hold the short  
posi t ions fo r  the nearby delivery month are coerced into buying back 
th e i r  futures posit ion a t  p r ice s  s e t  by the manipulator. Once the
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futures posit ions have been o f f se t  by delivery of the good, and normal 
o f f se t t in g  procedures, pressure on the demand for  the cash commodity 
or instrument f a l l s .  The prices f a l l  for  the commodity in the cash 
market and the cornerer  is  l e f t  with disposing of  the cash commodities 
a t  a loss. This dilemma often i s  refe rred  to as burying the corpse.
I t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to prove tha t  manipulation has occurred. A 
prosecutor must es tab l ish  the normal price spread and explain any 
d is to r t ion  from the normal price spread. Once d is to r t io n  has been 
shown, the d is to r t io n  must be traced to the alleged suspect.
Congress has wri t ten fourteen sect ions in the CEA tha t  
address manipulation. None of them define manipulation. The infamous 
sect ion 3 s ta te s  tha t  manipulations are events which frequently occur. 
Over the years ,  since 1922, few cases of any signif icance found an 
in ten t  of manipulation. An advisory committee to the CFTC in 1975 
considered the topic o f  speculative posit ion l im i ts .  The report  con­
tained the following conclusions:
The idea of controlling speculators as though they were less 
important or more dangerous than hedgers is basically unsound. 
Speculative position limits, by their nature, point the finger of 
suspicion at speculators. In fact, however, five of the eight 
market manipulation cases brought under the Commodity Exchange Act 
between 1972 and 1975 were against commercial operators with hedging 
exemptions for at least a major part of their trading (Allen, 1.981; 
127) .
The CEA defined speculative posi t ions as those not considered 
to be bona f ide  hedges. These speculative posit ions are subject  to 
l im i ts .  These l im its  are on the volume tha t  can be traded daily  and 
posi t ions held in cer ta in  contrac ts .  In August 1975, the CFTC 
organized four advisory committees to consider several topics .  One 
committee considered speculative posi t ion l im i ts .  The CFTC advisory
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committee believed th a t  speculative posit ion l im i ts  may diminish compel, 
t i t i o n  and give an upper hand to commercial users, because these posi tion 
or  trading l im i ts  do not apply to bona f ide  hedgers. Under current 
regula t ion ,  the commercial users are in a b e t t e r  posi t ion to exert  
speculative influences on prices than the speculators . Commercial users 
are in a s i tu a t ion  to benefi t  the most from biased prices  because the 
speculators '  only in te r e s t  is being r igh t  about pr ice movement. The 
regulation of markets should refocus i t s  a t ten t ion  toward balancing the 
power between hedgers and speculators (Paul, 1981). The persons most 
able to observe manipulative attempts are the market pa r t ic ipan ts .  
Par t ic ipan ts  have an a t t i tu d e  th a t  the market is  bigger than any of 
the users of the market and price  d is to r t ions  wil l be corrected by the 
fiiarketplace.
"I hope the CFTC will have an equally impressive s t a f f  (as the 
Treasury). Ours i s  not as big nor powerful enough" (Business Week,
June 11, 1979:65). Futures markets are t rue economic markets. Attempts 
to associa te  speculation with gambling and with the sole participants, 
responsible fo r  manipulation de t rac t  from the economic benefi ts  of 
futures trading.  The a c t i v i t i e s  of hedgers and speculators determine 
prices which are avai lable  to the public . This is  an extremely 
important process useful to people in th is  country and around the globe. 
I t  is  important tha t  laws passed by Congress demonstrate a keen grasp 
of the issues.  Laws which favor one side of the market or punish a 
p a r t i cu la r  segment u l timately will upset the competitive nature of 
futures markets.
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Information about a market serves to reduce the uncertainty 
which promotes market l iq u id i ty .  Futures markets aid producers in 
a l loca t ing  th e i r  inventories more e f f i c i e n t ly .  Information about the 
future  price of an asse t  a f fec ts  the supply provided in the spot market. 
For example, a c a t t l e  producer can look a t  futures prices 12 to 18 
months in advance and prepare his c a t t l e  for  the market so as to 
coincide the delivery month with the best price.
Without hedging, there would be no futures  t rading.  Hedging 
needs are subject  to outside fac tors  such as government stock pi l ing 
which would reduce the necessity  of hedging. I f  hedging is  dimin­
ished, the usefulness of futures trading is  impaired. "The chronic 
th rea t  to futures trading is  lack of understanding of the more subtle  
point th a t  e ffect iveness  fo r  hedging depends upon speculation" (Gray, 
1978:234)**. The government cannot take measures which are intended 
for  one side of the market without t h i s  action affect ing  the other side.
By tracing the development of the laws regarding futures market 
regulation and the administrat ion of those laws, two categories pro­
vided by regulation can be id en t i f ied :  (1) prevention of market d i s ­
to r t ion  and (2) protection of  the public from misuses of  futures  t r a d ­
ing .
Market d is to r t io n  r e f e r s  to manipulative attempts to coerce 
price movement'in a manipulator 's  favor. The government acts to pre­
vent manipulation via  a speculative posit ion and trading l im i ts  and
'‘Roger Gray, "Why Does Futures Trading Succeed or Fail: An
Analysis of Selected Carar&odities ," Views from the Trade, Vol. Ill, 
Readings in Futures Markets (.Chicago, 111.: Board of Trade of the
City of Chicago, 1978), pp. 235-248.
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margin requirements. Manipulation involves lega l ly  proving in ten t  and 
economically establtsMng^ th a t ,p r ic e s  were contrived.  The delivery 
month of a contract  i s  c ruc ia l .  All contracts  carry an obligation to
make or take delivery of the instrument or commodity being traded
(95%:of a l l  contracts  are o f f s e t  p r io r  to the delivery date) .  The 
p oss ib l i ty  of delivery moves the cash and futures prices toward 
convergence as the delivery date advances. The CFTC focuses on the 
delivery month when looking fo r  indicat ions of manipulation. I t  assesses 
the s ize of open in te r e s t  and r e l a t e s  i t  to the deliverable  supply.
Prices are most l ike ly  to get out of l ine  in a delivery month 
because of a delivery squeeze. What Congress has pegged as sudden or
unreasonable price  f luc tuat ions  most l ike ly  occur in delivery months,
thus what appears to be manipulative in ten t  are  frequently  sudden cor­
rections in mistaken pr ices .  What appears to be manipulation is  not 
manipulation. This stereotype of price  manipulation is  harmful because 
measures often are taken by the CFTC, with pressure from Congress, to 
curb speculation by imposing posi t ion l im i ts .  By correcting a per­
ceived abuse, the e ff ic iency  of the market in adjusting i t s e l f  is  
impaired.
The major th ru s t  of government controls has; been an or ien ta t ion  
toward curbing excess speculation.  When does necessary speculation 
become excessive? Necessary speculation is  the minimum aggregate which 
balances hedging posi t ions .  I f ,  however, the hedgers are net shor t ,  
the option for  the  speculators to be short  also must be made avai lab le .  
Some speculators want to be short  and some want to be long. This con­
d i t ion  must be considered when deciding what c o n s t i tu te s  necessary
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speculation.  When does speculation become excessive? Congress does 
not define excessive in the CEA. Tools are provided to curb specula­
t io n ,  but s i tua t ions  which warrant implementing those tools  are not 
recognized by leg i s la t io n .
The episode in the s i lv e r  futures  contrac t  in March 1980 brought 
recent murmurings from Congress and the CFTC to curb speculation. The 
s i l v e r  debacle was given widespread coverage in a l l  major newspapers 
and magazines. The pub l ic i ty  was dubious toward futures markets. The 
center  of publ ic i ty  was Nelson Bunker Hunt who, in March 1980, was long 
200 m ounces of  s i l v e r  futures contracts .  Hunt's announcement on March 
26 th a t  he and his f r iends planned to se l l  bonds backed by s i l v e r  caused 
Wall S t ree t  to ponder. Why did Hunt need so much cash? The doubts 
expressed by Wall S t ree t  spread and s i lv e r  prices dropped from $50 an 
ounce to $10.80 in the l a s t  week of March.
Margin ca l l s  of $100 mil l ion were made by Bache Halsey Stuar t  
and Shields to Hunt who was unavailable when the c a l l s  were made. The 
se c u r i t i e s  firm proceeded to l iqu ida te  Hunt's s i l v e r  future posit ion.
The react ion by the f in an c ia l  markets was tumultuous. The Dow Jones 
Industr ial  Average shed 32.17 points on March 27 before gaining 62 
points on the same day by closing time. Gold, which had been trading 
a t  $463 an ounce, rose above $500. The Federal Reserve Board contacted 
senior  executives of s e c u r i t i e s  firms to check th e i r  responses to the 
c r i s i s .  Congress, of course, opened inves t iga t ions .
It was during that period.that a prominent economist— a Harvard 
Ph.D. no less— was contributing greatly to Congress’ better under­
standing of the economics of futures markets, through his incessant 
repetition of the phrase speculative bubble and his unabashed 
assertion (before.several Congressional committees) that the best 
futures markets are those with relatively modest levels of
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speculation— such as Kansas City or Minneapolis--I speak of course 
of Dr. Stone the chairman of the CFTC (Stassen, 1981:31).
As a r e s u l t  of the s i l v e r  price f lu c tu a t io ns ,  Stone called 
fo r  remedies to stem the dangerous upsurge in commodity speculation.
He proposed to ra i se  speculative margin requirements sharply,  impose 
posi t ion l im its  on investors in a l l  con trac ts ,  and r e s t r i c t  amounts 
a bank or broker could loan for  commodity speculation. The proposals 
were made in the l ig h t  of the market 's success.
Walter Goldschmidt sa id ,
For me, the salient aspect of these events has been that the system 
worked, that the market in the final analysis prevailed; that 
every clearing member met its obligations and that no participant 
in the market, either speculator or commercial hedger suffered 
financially from a failure of the system itself. The market is 
bigger than any of its participants (U.S., Congress, Senate,
Hearing, June 26, 1980:3).
Walter Goldschmidt was correct  from the standpoint of competitive 
markets. Manipulations will be corrected by the market i f  l e f t  to 
trade out. The only person who was hurt  was Nelson Bunker Hunt and 
other  speculators seeking to manipulate the s i l v e r  futures  price .
S t r i c t  government regulation tha t  punishes speculators  reveals 
a lack o f  understanding of the specu la to r 's  ro le .  Government e f fo r t s  
to punish speculators will reduce speculation, ye t  speculation improves 
market performance provided th a t  speculators possess knowledge of the 
market. Speculators who make i ll - informed decisions wil l lose quickly 
in futures trading. In t h e i r  own s e l f - i n t e r e s t , t r a d e r s  wil l endeavor 
to be well informed.
Talk of ra is ing  margin requirements has increased, along with, 
f inancial  futures growth. Unfortunately, the focus on ra is ing  margin 
requirements by government and fu tures  market c r i t i c s  may outpace t h e i r
53
understanding of margins. For instance,  Forbes published an a r t i c l e  in 
1981 dealing with the surge in f inancial  fu tures .  The authors expressed 
concern about the smaller margin required for  futures contracts  than in 
stock investments.
In purchasing Treasury bills, for example, a down payment of $1,000 
can secure.a contract on $1 million worth of bills. A similar 
investment in stocks with 50% margin requirement would take a down 
payment of $500,000 (O'Connell and Bagamery, 1981:67).
Forbes i s  incorrec t  in comparing futures margin with stock 
margin. The two are not comparable. Futures margin i s  a guarantee 
of performance of a legal contract .  Both long and shorts  post margin. 
Stock margin is  a down payment fo r  property received. The lender of 
the balance charges the purchaser i n te r e s t  on the loan. This confusion 
comes from those who are expected to understand the difference between 
commodity and stock margin. This misunderstanding i s  but the t ip  of 
the iceberg. Some government proposals have cal led fo r  the increase 
of conmiodity margins f ive  to ten times above current  leve ls .  (On the 
other  side of the coin, o f f i c i a l s  murmur th a t ,  perhaps, bona f ide 
hedging margins could be handled d i f f e r e n t ly . )  The leverage on futures 
contracts  scares many government o f f i c i a l s .  Why? I t  stems from the 
bias against  speculation.  Speculators must be up to something.1
Margins se t  by a bureaucracy tha t  does not understand i t s  
function will harm the f u n c t i o n o f  futures markets. Talk of rais ing 
margins sharply would have damaging impacts i f  higher margins became 
a r e a l i t y .  A study prepared by Robert Bear, "Margin Levels and the 
Behavior of  Futures Pr ices ,"  examined the Chicago Board of Trade's 
wheat and soybean futures prices from 1948-1969. The study showed th a t  
abnormal price  conduct was corre la ted  with high margin leve ls ,  not low
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margin levels  (Kuhn, 1981). Margins are seen as a way to control 
speculation.  The empirical evidence, although l imited ,  does not sup­
port  margin increases to curb speculation as an e ffec t ive  measure to 
control price f luc tua t ions .
The nature of the regulatory process also can have negative
impacts on futures markets and t raders  of the markets. Congress
se t  up the CFTC to be an independent regulatory agency which functions as
a (1) ruTe-maker, (2) policeman of the futures markets, (3) D is t r i c t
Attorney as prosecutor of alleged v io la tors  of futures t rad ing ,
(4) grand ju ry ,  and (5) judge and jury to decide the case. Former
CFTC chairman William Bagley sa id ,
When the town marshall hauls you to the village justice court for 
a traffic violation and you suddenly find that the marshall is 
also the town administrator [who] doubles as the justice of the 
peace and gets credit for his convictions, you are in trouble 
(Bagley, 1980:10).
The problem with the CFTC assuming a l l  the above functions 
is  dua l i ty .  I t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  for  the CFTC to remain impartial when 
defense o f  the commission's prosecution,  respons ib i l i ty  fo r  repar­
a t io n s ,  and t h e i r  reputation i s  on the l ine .  I t  i s  too much to expect 
a regulatory agency to judge f a i r l y  a defendant's  blameworthiness with 
so much a t  stake.
Another problem with, the regulatory  process i s  the i so la t ion  
between the commissioners of the agency and the public. As ru le -  
makers, Congress depends upon i t s  s t a f f  fo r  information about topics 
of concern. The s t a f f  i s  chosen by the House and Senate members.
S ta f f  members communicate th e i r  perceptions of a s i tu a t io n  to the 
rule-makers. Regulatory agencies such as the CFTC hire  s t a f f s  to
55
combine const i tuent  elements submitted in wri ting by the public. The 
nature of the role  of the s t a f f  member as l ia ison  between commissioners 
and the public can i so la te  the commissioners from th e i r  cons t i tu ten ts .
A s t a f f  member of the CFTC commented to William Bagley, then chairman 
of the CFTC, "You (as chairman) don ' t  need to speak to the public or 
to the industry (a part  of  the public)  because we, the s t a f f  represent  
the public" (Bagley, J980:10).
This a t t i tu d e  can permeate the content of ru les  adopted by the 
CFTC and cause problems. I t  i s  almost as i f  rules are made in a 
vacuum because of th i s  i so la t ion  inbred between commissioners and 
const i tuen ts .  The impact th i s  has on futures  markets i s  negative.
A bias by s t a f f  members against  speculation can creep into ru les  made 
by the commission. This bias will serve only to harm the economic 
e ff ic iency  of futures markets i f  i t  takes the form of curbing specula­
t ion .
Where does regulatory reform of  the process en ter  in? In 
order for  defendents to receive due process under the law, the CFTC 
should no longer serve in a quas i - jud ic ia l  capaci ty. The CFTC should 
continue i t s  rule-making, in v es t ig a t iv e ,  and indictment functions but 
not remain the judge. I t  would be perferable  to allow independently 
composed administrat ive courts be the surrogates.
The communication between the commissioners and the public 
(.of which the futures industry i s  a par t )  needs to be opened up.
Openness will bring understanding. As i t  i s  now in the federal 
regulatory mechanism, CFTC meetings are open to the public ,  but s t a f f  
policy papers are kept sec re t .  The courts fu r the r  complicated an
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atmosphere of openness by ruling in the 1977 Home Box case th a t ,  
under some circumstances, commissioners cannot speak to the public.
The D is t r i c t  of Columbia c i r c u i t  court  in the Home Box case suspended 
the e f fe c t  of  a regulation because an industry o f f i c i a l  had communica­
t ion with the commission a f t e r  the hearings record had closed (Bagley, 
1980).
This se t t in g  is  not conducive to openness but suspicion. I f  
discussion of public issues such as fu tures  trading were fu r the r  
opened, understanding, responsiveness, and accountabil i ty  would 
re s u l t .  Regrettably,  th is  reform is not impending. William Bagley 
was not popular with congressional members as head of the CFTC. He 
resigned before his term was completed. In re t rospec t ,  Bagley offered 
some ins igh t  into problems with current  regulatory procedures and 
predicted the future fo r  the CFTC.
Because we at the Commodity Futures Trading Commission are 
new, we have infused ourselves with the verve, the fervor, and 
the chemistry needed to start a new endeavor. We today are a 
bright, brand new shining star in the regulatory galaxy, but it 
won't last.
It is inherent within the concept of the "independent" com­
mission, without accountability and without a real and ready con­
stituency, that we will be "captured" either by the industry or 
by our own regulatory malaise. I don't know which is worse.
Instead of being a microcosm of social and political concerns, 
a commission becomes an isolated island accountable to no one—  
not really knowing who is its constitutency.
Though Congress tries through budget and oversight hearings to 
provide some accountability, congressional efforts are either on 
a hit-and-miss basis or get bogged down within congressional 
bureaucracy and jurisdictional infighting (U.S., Congress, House, 
Hearing, March 22, d977:T61) .
Bagley was confronted by the House Agriculture Committee because 
of th is  statement. After James Whitten, chairman of  the committee, read
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Bagley's statement into  the record, Whitten's f i r s t  response was to 
ask Bagley where he found the time to run the commission to control 
the exchanges.
Chapter 5
CURRENT AND FUTURE ISSUES
Computerized Trading
The CEA requires exchanges to enforce rules  which are subject  
to approval by the CFTC. The CFTC grants contrac t  markets a l ic en se ,  
to operate only i f  they demonstrate competence to prevent manipulations 
and corners and to perform se l f - regu la to ry  r e s p o n s ib i l i t i e s .  Contract 
markets have a primary obligation to conduct market suveillance while 
the commission is  committed to a general oversight of futures trading 
a c t i v i t i e s .  Under the CEA, a scheme of se l f - reg u la t io n  i s  expected of 
the commodity exchanges. The federal  regulatory agency ensures tha t  
the exchanges have adopted and are enforcing rules of trading a c t i v i ­
t i e s .
The his tory  of exchanges in re la t io n  to pub l ic i ty  has been for  
the exchanges to r e ta in  a low p ro f i le .  This was because of the general 
negative a t t i tu d e  held by the public about fu tures  t rading.  This low 
p ro f i le  image has changed. Now the exchanges have educational and 
marketing programs promoting futures markets. The exchanges sponsor 
research,  symposia, seminars, and produce films to fu r th e r  the under­
standing of futures markets.
In the 1960s, exchanges embarked upon programs to promote 
speculation. The concerns expressed by the exchanges in t h i s  promotion 
were (1) to what extent  should they advance commodity and i n t e r e s t - r a t e
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futures to the public and (2) what is involved in teaching the public 
how to speculate? Authors of futures material  agree tha t  exchanges 
have a r espons ib i l i ty  to emphasize tha t  futures trading is  a zero 
sum game minus commission. Futures commission merchants who trade for  
the small speculator  have an obligation to ensure t raders  have ade­
quate venture capi ta l  and understand the rules  of  t rading. The 
investment objectives of the speculator must be probed by the, futures 
commission merchants.
Current issues which have an impact on speculators as well 
as hedgers in futures markets are (1) congressional advocates of 
computerized trading who encourage th a t  i t  replace f loo r  t rad ing ,
(2) the s ta r t -u p  of the National Futures Association,  and (.3) contract  
trading fee proposals.
C r i t ic s  of computerized trading claim tha t  replacing the f loor  
trading of  futures would diminish the function of the p i t s  as a gener­
a to r  of opinions. Leo Melamed said th a t  the replacement of f loor  
trading futures  with computer terminals i s  equally as 'advantageous as 
eliminating Congress, The synthesis of information on the trading 
f lo o r  and the resu l t ing  price mechanism is  comparable to congressional 
debates and the f inal  vote. Both f loors serve as a place for  the 
exchange of ideas necessary for  the operat ion of the markets and 
rule-making a c t i v i t i e s .
Opponents of computerized trading believe th a t  f loor  t raders  
contr ibute  to market l iq u id i ty  in the process of t h e i r  discussion 
and trading prac t ices .  Proponents of computerized trading believe 
futures trading would be more e f f i c i e n t  and contr ibute  to market
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l iq u id i ty  by improving information. Presently ,  automated futures 
trading is  not possible  on the exchanges in th i s  country.
National Futures Association
The National Futures Association (NFA) placed an application 
before the CFTC as a se l f - regu la to ry  organization overseeing futures 
commission merchants and associate  members of exchanges. The 1978 CEA 
allows a reg is te red  futures associat ion to have mandatory membership.
The NFA will re l ieve  the CFTC of  some of i t s  paper work such as the 
r e g i s t r a t io n  of exchange members.
The NFA is  under the same e th ica l  considerations as contract  
markets--to prevent fraud and deceptive trading p rac t ices .  In addi­
t io n ,  i t  will screen app l ican ts  fo r  membership or associate  membership 
in the assoc ia t ion .  I t  will provide a cen tra l ized  a rb i t r a t io n  system 
fo r  commodity futures  d isputes .  This will lessen pressure on contract  
markets; the contract  markets wil l be able to delegate authori ty  to the 
associat ion to a r b i t r a t e  disputes .  The NFA plans to police t ransactions 
on and o f f  exchanges. I t  also plans to receive funding from annual 
dues payable by fu tures  commission merchants and a contract  fee of 
$0.25 per round-turn o f  fu tures  contracts  on a l l  the exchanges.
In a surpr ise  move in the fu tures  industry ,  Robert Wilmouth, 
pres ident  of the Chiacao Board of Trade, has resigned to head the 
NFA. This wil l lend pres t ige  to the f ledgling assoc ia t ion;  however, 
the Chicago Board of Trade may become a less  v iable  force in Washington 
because Robert Wilmouth was widely respected on Capitol Hi l l .
All eleven contract  markets have automatic seats  on. the NFA's 
board of d i rec to rs .  To prevent domination of any contract  market region,
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the country has been divided into three regions. Each region will have 
members on the board and not more than one h a l f  the board members may 
come from the same geographical region. Three members not associated 
with futures trading will be selected from the public.
The importance o f  the s ta r t -up  of a se l f - regu la to ry  associa­
t ion of futures markets must be recognized. Futures industry o f f i c i a l s  
long have enter ta ined a notion th a t  the most e f fec t iv e  regulation will 
stem from sources who know the industry the bes t—i t s  own members. The 
impact th is  wil l have on public speculators and professional  speculators 
in the p i t s  wil l be favorable in terms of understanding speculative 
functions. Speculators will, have more confidence in regulators who 
know the industry inside out and do not have a h is tory  of past  bias .
Contract Trading Fee Proposal
The contract  fee proposal to fund the NFA has been receiving 
publ ic i ty  in the Wall S tr e e t  Journal, Barron's, and the Congressional 
Q uarterly. The CFTC asked the House and Senate Agricultural Committees 
to grant i t  the power to assess a contract  trading fee. Pressure from 
the Reagan administ rat ion to cut federal budgets of the agencies sent  
the CFTC looking for  p a r t i a l  funding from the industry i t  regulates.  
Budget d i rec to r  David Stockman warned Senate and House committee panels 
th a t  b i l l s  reauthorizing the CFTC fo r  four more years  would be vetoed 
by the President i f  they did not provide fo r  a CFTC contrac t  fee.
The CFTC has s ta ted  th a t  the user fee would pay $22 m in ion  of 
the $23 mil l ion proposed budget for  f i sca l  year 1983. The CFTC 
contract  fee would also be $0.25 per round-turn fu tures  contract .
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Proponents of the NFA have expressed dismay with the CFTC proposal.
They argue tha t  existence of the associat ion would a l l e v ia te  enforcement 
duties of the CFTC. Because the FNA planned a contract  fee for  i t s  
funding, a s imila r  fee assessed by the CFTC would be a  duplicat ion of 
regulatory e f f o r t s .  The NFA o f f i c i a l s  say the industry won't stand for  
two assessments for  one service.
The dispute between the NFA and CFTC came to  a head a t  a Futures 
Industry Association meeting in Florida. Phil ip  Johnson, chairman of 
the CFTC, delivered a s tern  message to futures o f f i c i a l s  in regard to NFA 
pro tes ts .  Johnson, sa id ,  "The p ro tes t  ra ises  doubt about the industry 's  
commitment to g rea te r  se l f - regu la t ion"  ("Commodity O f f i c i a l s ,  Regula- 
t ions Clash," 1982:38).
Clayton Yeutter ,  president of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, 
likened the CFTC fee to a tax. The fee proposed by the CFTC would be
paid to the U.S. Treasury not to the CFTC d i r e c t ly .  Yeutter sa id ,
"I should think we'd be e n t i t l e d  to par t  of the defense budget in 
th a t  case" ("Commodity O f f i c i a l s ,  Regulations Clash," 1982:38).
In any event,  the House and Senate Agricultural  Committees' 
b i l l s  to reauthorize the CFTC scrapped the CFTC contract  user-fee  plan. 
This act ion was taken in sp i te  of  President Reagan's preference for  
the CFTC fee. The dispute i s  not over y e t .  The House and Senate b i l l s  
remain to be passed on the respective f loors .  I t  i s  ant ic ipa ted  th a t  
the b i l l s  will have a tougher time passing Congress than in the commit^ 
t ee .  A concrete decision is  therefore  not a present  r e a l i t y .  Congress
recesses in July;  futures l eg i s la t io n  wil l  b.e:voted upon between now
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and July.  Until the b i l l s  become law, the NFA and CFTC remain uncertain 
as to who will charge the fee.
Trends in Congressional Views 
of Speculation
In 1978, trading volume on the eleven exchanges was 58,5 
mill ion contracts .  By 1981, trading volume had increased to 98.5 
mill ion contrac ts .  Congress i s  amazed by these f igures .  What once was 
an industry of ag r icu l tu ra l  commodities dominated, by a se lec t  number of 
traders has completely changed. Futures contracts  for  t r ad i t ion a l  
ag r icu l tu ra l  commodities waned because of changes in the production 
and marketing of these commodities. The makeup of the f lo o r  traders 
consequently changed. A common c h a ra c te r i s t i c  of  today^s speculators 
trading on the exchanges is t h e i r  youth. Many are baby boom kids who 
have been trading fo r  l e s s  than f ive  years: (Katz,, 1981).
Mike Weinberg, an 80-year-old second-generation commodities 
t rader  in Chicago has witnessed many changes over the years on the t r ad ­
ing f loo r .  Weinberg pointed out th a t  one change i s  the  degree of r i sk  
involved. This has increased dramatical ly in today's climate of i n t e r ­
e s t  ra te  v o l a t i l i t y  (Katz, 1981).
New f inancial  fu tu res  contracts have developed in response to an 
increased v o l a t i l i t y  of i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  on t reasury b i l l s ,  t reasury bonds, 
c e r t i f i c a t e s  of deposi t ,  and Eurodollars th a t  borrowers must pay in 
order to secure loans. Thus new groups have entered the market to trade 
in fu tures .  Some of the new pa r t ic ipan ts  a re  brokerage fi rms, mortgage 
bankers, corporations, government secur i ty  dea le rs ,  and individuals .
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Members of Congress, as well as the public ,  have problems grasping the 
growth in trading contracts .  No one dreamed th a t  futures would evolve 
into  the instruments being traded and proposed.
Growth in financial  futures has created a dispute between the 
CFTC and the Securi t ies  Exchange Commission along ju r isd ic t io n a l  
guidel ines.  Normally, the Securi t ies  Exchange Commission regulates 
fixed income se cu r i t ie s  and stocks.  The CFTC has ju r i s d ic t io n  over 
a l l  futures contracts .  Batt les  tha t  developed between the agencies 
have been quite  tense a t  times. The two agencies recently  reached 
an informal agreement which was overturned by a United States appeals 
court  in Chicago. Congress stepped in and transformed the informal 
agreement into law wri t ten in to  the CFTC reauthorizat ion b i l l s .
The CFTC e s se n t ia l ly  will re ta in  ju r i s d ic t io n  over a l l  com­
modity futures: contracts  and options: on futures including options 
on GNMAs and treasury b i l l s .  The Securi t ie s  Exchange Commission 
ju r i s d ic t io n  includes options on s e c u r i t ie s  or groups of s e cu r i t ie s  
(such as stock indexes). The CFTC was affirmed the regula tor  of 
futures on stock indexes subject  to Securi t ies  Exchange Commission 
reyiew. The agreement has the support of CFTC chairman Phil ip 
Johnson and Securi t ies  Exchange Commission chairman John Shad. There 
are those who believe,  including some members of Congress, th a t  the 
blurred l ines  between the CFTC and the Securi t ies  Exchange Commission 
wil l c reate  a merger of the two.
Many members of Congress are not comfortable with the developing 
f inancia l  contracts  and the stock index futures  contracts .  Representa­
t iv e s  John Dingell,  Dan Glickman, Benjamin Rosenthal,  and Senator
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William Proxmire are vocal in expressing doubts about the a b i l i t y  of the 
contract  markets to regulate  themselves. Representative Dingell especi­
a l ly  is no fr iend of futures markets. Dingell wants to p roh ib i t  trading 
on stock index fu tures .  He says these contracts  are synonomous with 
gambling and may d iver t  capita l  from equity markets. (Americans have 
$1.4 t r i l l i o n  Tong on stocks; stock index futures would be an excel len t  
opportunity to hedge por tfo l ios  from erosion of equity c a p i t a l . )
Representative Dingell is expected to oppose the House b i l l  
reauthorizing the CFTC. "There . . . [is.] a very strong p o s s ib i l i ty  
th a t  he will t ry  to amend the CFTC b i l l  to proh ib i t  these t ransactions 
(stock-indexes) and he has also introduced separate  leg i s la t io n  (HR 
5515) to declare a moratorium on stock index trading" (Wehr, 1982:812). 
Dingell chairs the Powerful House Energy and Commerce Committee which 
has ju r i s d ic t io n  over federal s e c u r i t ie s  law, so he wields authori ty  
in the House.
Another current  issue impacting speculators i s  the future  of 
the CFTC. Prominent members of Congress believe the CFTC cannot 
regulate  the unruly futures industry.  Scathing reports  by the House 
Government Operations Committee c r i t i c i z e d  the CFTC's handling of the 
1980 s i l v e r  c r i s i s .  The report  declared th a t  the CFTC fa i led  to 
employ the preventive and emergency actions prescribed by law.
Representive Benjamin Rosenthal sa id ,  "The Commission is  too 
weak to monitor the industry and . . . the exchanges whose board mem­
bers are often traders  and brokers cannot regulate  themselves"
(Williams, 1982:18). Att itudes such as Mr. Rosenthal 's do not help 
the s i tu a t io n .
The CFTC was created to regulate  a changing industry ,  but 
members of the body which gave i t  l i f e  do not support i t .  The five 
ro ta t ing  commission seats  on the CFTC have not always been f i l l e d  
promptly when vacant. The President appoints the commissioners with 
the advice and consent of the Senate. This process has been p o l i t i ­
cized to the extent  th a t ,  in 1979, the Senate Agricul tural  Committee 
warned the White House in a l e t t e r  th a t  a p a r t i cu la r  nomination 
was poin tless  because i t  would not confirm the nomination.
The nomination process fo r  the CFTC is  considered a long­
standing game between the players.  Currently, one posi t ion i s  vacant 
on the CFTC. (Two names are being considered: Michael Werner and
Fowler West.) Why do these vacancies p e rs i s t?  An aide to the House 
Agricultural Committee pointed out th a t  long delays had been common 
on CFTC appointments. ".It doesn ' t  get p r io r i ty  a t t en t io n ,"  he said 
(Cohen, 1982:3, section 2).
The statement by the s t a f f  member lends more ins igh t  into  the 
matter than one rea l izes  when f i r s t  reading i t .  "It d o esn 't g e t  
■priority a tte n tio n ."  This i s  the same Congress t h a t  complains tha t  
the changing futures  industry has caused i t  to struggle to gain a 
handle on the implications.  I f  Congress i s  so concerned, why doesn 't  
i t  ensure th a t  the regulatory agency which was created by i t s  law in 
1974 is  run by a whole commission?
I t  seems as I f  there is  a divergence of goals. Has the 
p o l i t i c a l  process impeded the development of  the CFTC? William Bag- 
l e y ' s  testimony before the House Agricultural Committee in 1978 
seems quite  timely in 1982. Congressional e f fo r t s  are  on a h i t -and -
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miss basis and bureaucracy bogs them down. Congressional inf ight ing 
impedes i t s  understanding of issues i t  i s  attempting to l e g i s l a t e .
In th a t  the House and Senate reauthorization b i l l s  denied the CFTC 
imposing a user fee on contract  market members contrary to President 
Reagan's wishes, fu ture  controversy can be expected i f  the b i l l s  are 
made into law.
The NFA is  the p rac t ica l  so lut ion.  Congress wanted a s e l f -  
regulatory body to develop in the futures industry and so s ta ted  in 
the 1978 neauthorization of the CFTC laws. The associat ion i s  a 
f ledg l ing ,  but i t  i s  in a posi t ion to be e f fec t ive .  Aided by the 
leadership of  Robert Wilmouth, the NFA gains c r e d i b i l i t y  necessary to 
any s ta r t -u p  organizat ion. Because the futures  industry i s  complex, 
reasoning implores fo r  a regulatory body which understands i t s  nuances.
Congress does not t r u s t  the futures industry to regulate  
i t s e l f ,  ye t  how responsive i s  i t  to futures markets issues? William 
Bagley sa id ,  "The antennae of many a Washington bureaucrat droops 
beyond the Beltway" (Bagley, 1980:10). Legislators surround them­
selves with s t a f f  members who deal with the public. Iso la t ion  re su l ts  
and therein l i e s  misunderstanding. Time and time again,  Congress pegs 
speculative a c t iv i ty  as gambling, e v i l ,  excessive, unwarranted, and 
manipulative. These a t t i tu d e s  have prevailed in sp i te  of a l l  the 
research of economists into  the workings of  futures markets. The 
l i t e r a t u r e  reveals th a t  congressional suspicions are unfounded. As a 
l ia i son  between the public and the l e g i s l a to r s ,  s t a f f  members r e l a t e  
information from the public to the l e g i s l a to r s .  I f  the information
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flowing upward has a chameleon c h a r a c t e r i s t i c ,  misunderstanding re su l ts  
in reasons for  passing laws.
Chapter 6
CONCLUSION
Ju s t ic  Holmes s ta ted  in the Board o f  Trade v . C h r is tie  Grain & 
Stock Co.3 198 U.S. 236, 247-48 decision in 1905 th a t
People will endeavor to forecast the future and to make agree­
ments according to their prophecy. Speculation of this kind by 
competent men is the self-adjustment of society to the probable.
Its value is well known as a means of avoiding or mitigating 
catastrophes, equalizing prices and providing for periods of want.
It is true that the success of the strong induces imitation by 
the weak, and that incompetent persons bring themselves to ruin by 
undertaking to speculate in their turn. But legislatures and 
courts generally have recognized that the natural evolutions of a 
complex society are to be touched only with a very cautious hand, 
and that such coarse attempts at a remedy for the waste incident 
to every social function as a simple prohibition and laws to stop 
its being are harmful and vain (Rainbolt, 1977:1).
Jus t ice  Holmes' statement i s  as timely in 1982 as i t  was in 
1905. The blending of law and economics is  inevi tab le  because of our 
increasingly complex society .  Both phenomena seek to achieve the same 
goals: "market i n te g r i ty ,  competitive p r ic ing ,  commercial freedom, and
governmental r e s t r a in t "  (Clark, 1978:1223), Futures markets are economic 
markets affected by national public in t e r e s t .  Attempts by the govern­
ment to define i t s  re la t ionsh ip  with.futures.markets  has been d i f f i c u l t .  
The government could improve i t s  understanding of  futures markets and 
thereby c la r i f y  the boundaries of i t s  l e g i s l a t iv e  j u r i s d ic t io n .  An 
acquired understanding of futures markets by Congress would improve the 
qua l i ty  of l e g i s la t io n  passed to regulate  futures  markets.
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How can Congress b e t t e r  understand futures  markets? There are 
three issues on which Congress could focus to improve i t s  understanding 
of  futures markets: (1) recognition of the uniqueness of futures
markets, (2) understanding the ro le  of market pa r t ic ipan ts  in futures 
t rad ing ,  and (3) working toward a balanced regulatory policy.
Futures markets are  unique among the economic markets. Charac­
t e r i s t i c s  pertain ing to futures  markets are fourfold:  (1) futures are
highly leveraged, (2) a l l  futures contracts  traded on the exchanges have 
daily  price l im i t  orders ,  a mark-to-market daily  cash settlement of 
open i n t e r e s t ,  (3) futures operate on a no-debt bas is ,  and (4) there 
i s  a short  fo r  every long futures contract  (Melamed, 1977). These 
c h a ra c te r i s t i c s  are not found in cash or equity markets.
In the p as t ,  superf ic ia l  s im i l a r i t i e s  between futures and stock 
markets have been responsible fo r  the applicat ion of secu r i t ie s  
laws to futures markets. Some congressional members draw comparisons 
between stock and futures markets and, based on these comparisons, 
apply the same regulatory framework to the two markets. Congress 
should, however, examine the underlying reasons fo r  entering stock or 
futures markets so th a t  i t  can grasp the d i s s im i la r i t i e s .
Congressional understanding o f  futures markets also could be 
furthered by increasing i t s  knowledge of the ro les  of futures markets 
pa r t ic ipan ts .  In order to achieve th i s  level of understanding, Congress 
should acknowledge the nature of futures markets. F i r s t ,  commodites 
are not futures and futures are not commodities (Bianco, 1977). 
Commodities are physical products. Futures contracts  trade the r igh ts  
to an item. Whether i t . i s  a commodity or a fixed income secur i ty  is
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not important; the concept i s  the same. There is  a d ifference between 
trading an item and trading the r igh ts  of an item.
Members of Congress s ta ted  they are seeking to come to grips 
with the evolving nature of futures markets into  f inancial  fu tures .
The le g i s l a t iv e  body should rea l ize  th a t  farmers are not the only 
pa r t ic ipan ts  in futures t rading. Futures trading is  not so le ly  an 
agr icu l tu ra l  phenomenon. There i s  a wide array of pa r t ic ipan ts  includ­
ing in s t i tu t io n a l  inves tors ,  government secur i ty  dea lers ,  business 
corporations, f inancial  i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  and indiv iduals .  Par t ic ipants  
in futures markets may have d i f f e r e n t  motives in futures  t rad ing ,  
but t h e i r  actions take the form of speculation or  hedging.
The role  of the speculator in futures  markets has been 
misunderstood throughout the years of futures  t rading. This mis­
understanding l i e s  in the his tory  of federal  regulat ion. Early l e g i s ­
la t ion  la id  the base fo r  present  confusion about speculation.  Consider 
a statement by Senator McGovern in 1973.
The people's interest in commodity trading transcends the orderly 
functioning of those markets and the prevention of outright fraud.. 
For every time a speculator turns an unreasonable profit by trading 
futures the housewife and :the consumer pay the price. And since 
it is the speculator, not the producer, who receives the windfall 
profit, the higher wholesale and retail prices do not act as a 
stimulant to production (jBianco, 1977:31) .
Senator McGovern was mistaken. Speculators do not turn 
unreasonable p r o f i t s .  Neither are any potent ial  p ro f i t s  windfalls .
This kind of misunderstanding needs to be corrected.  Congress should 
encourage members to read the research findings of economists and 
others knowledgeable about futures markets pa r t ic ipan ts .
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Congress must focus a t ten t ion  on understanding the true role  of 
the futures markets'  speculators . Understanding speculation would lead 
to an understanding of the hedging function.  Members then would. rea l ize  
th a t  one function cannot e x is t  without the other . The passage of laws 
to curb speculation ultimately will harm the hedging function.  Members 
of Congress can c le a r  up confusion about speculation by examining the 
nature of the roles of speculation and hedging. In p a r t i c u la r ,  members 
of committees in the House and Senate which have ju r i s d ic t io n  over the 
CFTC should educate themselves to the roles o f  fu tures  markets par­
t i c ip a n t s .
Members of Congress should take act ions to ensure th a t  regu­
la tory  po l ic ies  are balanced. The CFTC Act of 1974 granted; the CFTC 
exclusive ju r i s d ic t io n  over futures  trading. Congress should not 
allow the S ecu ritie s  Exchange Commission to  regulate  f inancial  futures 
in conjunction with the CFTC. Ju r isd ic t iona l  inf ight ing  would re s u l t  
i f  both commissions had regulatory influence over f inancial  fu tures .
The CFTC and the Securi t ie s  Exchange Commission should continue to 
work toward a compromise in regard to futures trading of options; 
f inancia l  fu tures  regulation should be l e f t  to the CFTC.
A balanced regulatory policy could be achieved by congressional 
acceptance of the NFA and continued re l iance  by Congress upon the 
fu tures  exchanges to perform se l f - regu la t io n .  Regulatory po l ic ies  s e t  
by the CFTC must be made ca re fu l ly ,  taking into  consideration a l l  
potential  impacts of poiicy on the economic v i a b i l i t y  of futures  
markets.
I f  members of Congress will educate themselves to the unique 
c h ra c te r i s t i c s  of futures markets, understand the roles  of futures 
markets p a r t i c ip a n ts ,  and maintain balanced regulatory po l ic ies  
regarding futures markets, futures  markets wil l remain in ta c t .  The 
r e s i l i e n t  ch a rac te r i s t i c  o f  futures markets should be c redited fo r :  
the growth and economic usefulness of fu tures .  I t  i s  up Congress to 
re f ine  the re la t ionship  between the law and futures markets.
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